ESSAYS ON INEQUALITY, HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY by A. Cardaci
Candidate: Alberto Cardaci
Supervisor: Prof. Domenico Delli Gatti
PhD Coordinator: Prof. Paolo Garella 
Academic Year 2014-2015
UNIVERSITY OF MILAN
LOMBARDY ADVANCED SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
PhD in Economics
XXVIII Cycle
Essays on
Inequality, Household Debt and 
Financial Instability
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 4
Inequality and Economics: a Literature Review ......................................................... 10
Inequality, Household Debt and Financial Instability: an Agent-Based Perspective .. 33
Inequality, Financialisation and Economic Crises: an Agent-Based Macro Model ..... 65
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 94
2
3
Introduction
1 Content of the Thesis
My Ph.D. thesis contributes to the growing literature on the link between
inequality and economic crises, focusing in particular on the relationship be-
tween rising income disparities, household debt dynamics and the resulting
financial instability.
In the first paper, I review both the theoretical and the empirical litera-
ture on inequality, by paying particular attention to the way this topic has
been treated over time by the economics research agenda. I show that the
impact of growing income disparities on the macroeconomy has been ignored
for a long period of time, particularly starting from the 80s. Only after the
recent financial crisis, the issue of income and wealth distribution has come
back on the top of the agenda of economists as well as policymakers.
In the other two papers, I build two macroeconomic models that focus
on the link between income inequality, household debt and economic crises.
The first one is an Agent-Based (AB) macroeconomic model aimed at de-
scribing the key mechanisms through which rising inequality jeopardises eco-
nomic stability in an economy with peer e↵ects in consumption and equity
extraction processes. I show that greater income disparities imply stronger
expenditure cascades along the income distribution as well as asset (i.e.
house) price appreciation. In the presence of home-equity based borrowing
behaviour by households, private debt rises thus pushing aggregate demand
upwards despite income stagnation over much of the distribution. However,
debt-driven consumption endogenously triggers the accumulation of a larger
amount of non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets which eventually
lead to a credit crunch and an economic downturn.
The second model, a joint work with Francesco Saraceno which I carried
out during my visiting period at OFCE-SciencesPo in Paris, is a macroeco-
nomic model with an Agent-Based household sector and a stock-flow con-
sistent structure. The goal of this work is to analyse the impact of rising
income inequality on the likelihood of a crisis under di↵erent institutional
settings and degrees of financialisation. In particular, we reproduce a multi-
tude of scenarios showing how financial and credit conditions interact with
the impact of growing inequality on the performance of the economy and
the accumulation of household debt. Our results show the relevance of the
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“degree” of financialisation of an economy. In fact, when inequality grows,
a Scyilla and Charybdis kind of dilemma seems to arise: on the one hand,
economies with low credit availability experience a drop in aggregate de-
mand and output; on the other hand, where credit constraints are relaxed
and the willingness to lend is higher, greater financial instability emerges
and a debt-driven boom and bust cycle. We also show that policy reactions
play a key role: a real structural reform that tackles inequality, by means of
a more progressive tax system, actually compensates for the rise in income
disparities thereby stabilising the economy. Results also show that this is a
much better solution compared to a stronger fiscal policy reaction, which,
instead, has no significant impact on the performance of the economy.
2 Complexity and Agent-Based Models
In this section, I would like to point out the key features of AB models and
as this is the methodological approach used for the purpose of my work.
The agent-based methodology lies within the paradigm of Complex Adap-
tive Evolutionary Systems, a highly interdisciplinary approach that ranges
from physics to linguistics, as well as economics, of course. As defined by
Flake (1998), a complex system is one that has macro properties that may
be traced back to the interactions of the micro units that are not properties
of the individual units themselves. Therefore, the idea of complexity is that
“the laws that describe the behaviour of a complex system are qualitatively
di↵erent from those that govern its units” (Vicsek, 2002). Put it di↵erently,
Vicsek (2002) points out complexity is the idea that the world is made of
several interconnected parts (agents, in our case) whose interactions produce
a complex result and global regularities that need di↵erent interpretations
of each level. As such, complexity fosters a holistic and organicist approach
in that the behaviour of the whole system depends on its single units but
it does not stem simply from sum of them. To clarify this, we can recall
the example by Denis (2010) who makes a comparison between the points
of view of two prominent economists on this matter: Friedman and Hayek.
Friedman (1962), who has a reductionist view, argues that the macro re-
sult is simply an aggregation of a large numbers of isolated microelements:
economics is based on the study of “a number of independent households, a
collection of Robinson Crusoes”. On the contrary, Hayek (1978) sees indi-
viduals merely as “the foci in the network of relationships”, thus stressing
the importance of the interconnections among individuals.
Friedman’s reductionist perspective drives current economic modelling:
as highlighted by Delli Gatti et al. (2011), “contemporary models postu-
late that there is not any significant di↵erence between microeconomics and
macroeconomics: the dynamics of the whole is nothing but a summation of
the dynamics of its components”.
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Agent-based models break the mainstream paradigm as they allow to
model the economy as a seldom system showing a tendency towards self-
organisation (Delli Gatti et al., 2011; Dolphin, 2012). That is, the economy
is modelled as a complex evolving system: it is an ecology populated by
heterogeneous agents whose interactions continuously change the structure
of the system (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012). Indeed, at the micro level,
agents repeatedly interact with each other based on adaptive and imitative
behaviours thus giving rise to stable and predictable aggregate configura-
tions at the macro level (Delli Gatti et al., 2011; Tesfatsion, 2006). However
emerging aggregate patterns and global regularities such as employment
and growth rates, income distributions, market institutions, and social con-
ventions have a feedback e↵ect into the determination of local interactions
among agents. That is to say, there is a mutual feedback between the system
of microstructures and the emerging macro regularities mediated by agent
interactions.
In AB models, agents may be economic and social entities as well as
biological or physical ones. In economics, agents are typically assumed to
have bounded rationality a la` Simon (1957; 1997; 2000) as well as adaptive
expectations. Indeed, the complexity of the human environment, the limited
cognitive and information processing capacities make the goal of optimisa-
tion virtually unrealisable in real life1; people, instead, rank viable options
in terms of degrees of satisfaction and act accordingly, until a previously
identified threshold of acceptability is met or exceeded (Schwartz et al.,
2002). In other words, the decision making process is based on a satisficing
principle (Simon, 1987): “to satisfice is to pursue not the best option, but a
good enough option” (Schwartz et al., 2002). Individual behaviour is driven
by simple heuristics that are nothing but encoded algorithmic programs or
instructions telling agents what to do (or not to do) when facing certain con-
tingencies (Delli Gatti et al., 2011). The design of such behavioural rules
and algorithms may evolve over time through adaptation to environmental
conditions.
Finally, another relevant feature of AB models deals with the solving
mechanism. As a matter of fact, despite the introduction of some Key-
nesian elements of rigidities (e.g. sticky prices, imperfect competition or
financial frictions), the standard approach in macroeconomics still entails a
Walrasian perspective: a general equilibrium solution that implicitly or ex-
plicitly implies the presence of a fictitious auctioneer who sets prices before
exchanges take place, thus paving the way for market clearing. However,
this is “a coordination device that eliminates the possibility of strategic be-
havior” (Tesfatsion, 2006). Indeed, it rules out almost by definition the
possibility of interactions carried out by heterogeneous individuals (Fagiolo
1Some agent-based models with optimising agents exist though. See for example Dosi
and Staccioli (2015).
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and Roventini, 2012). Contrary to the mainstream approach, agent-based
models do not assume any centralised solving mechanism: no equilibrium is
exogenously chosen; instead, AB models allow for the endogenous formation
of an equilibrium, if it exists (Delli Gatti et al., 2011).
All the features mentioned above make agent-based models extremely
flexible tools that can be used as computational laboratories for the analysis
of policies under more realistic scenarios.
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Abstract
This paper provides a review of both the theoretical and empirical
literature on inequality, by paying particular attention to the way this
topic has been treated over time by the economics research agenda.
Indeed, after being at the core of the economic profession for decades,
the issue of inequality has entered a phase of declining interest start-
ing from the 80s. The issue of inequality has been ignored for so long
due to several reasons, among which we find Kuznets’s optimistic con-
clusions (Piketty, 2013), the emergence of new mathematical models
based upon the representative agent postulate (Piketty, 2013; Mian
and Sufi, 2014), and the belief that people can make an e cient use
of credit markets to insure against temporary fluctuations of income
(van Treeck, 2012). However, after the recent financial crisis, the issue
of income and wealth distribution has come back on top of the agenda
of economists as well as policymakers.
Keywords: Inequality, Household Debt, Credit Markets, Literature
Review
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1 Introduction: Key Facts About Inequality
How unequal is our world? How has income distribution changed over the
last decades? After being neglected for the past years, inequality has come
back on top of the agenda of both economists and policymakers. The former
have been collecting a wide range of data in order to answer to the ques-
tions mentioned above; the latter are increasingly concerned about local and
global widening income disparities.
The empirical literature suggests we live in an incredibly unequal planet.
Ortiz and Cummins (2011) provide an overview of global, regional and
national income inequalities based on World Bank, UNU-WIDER and Euro-
stat data. Using two di↵erent methodologies1, they find that “the wealthiest
20 percent of mankind enjoyed nearly 83 percent of total global income com-
pared to the poorest 20 percent” (Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). Even more
striking is that the poorest 40 percent increased its income share by less
than 1 percent in the period between 1990 and 2007. Data are slightly
better under a di↵erent estimation methodology but “both models reveal a
world that is deeply corroded by income disparities” (Ortiz and Cummins,
2011). In addition, as far as some progress seems to be taking place for the
poorest, the authors estimate that, at this speed, it would take 855 years
for the bottom billion people to gain 10 percent of global income.
Moatsosm et al. (2014) use six di↵erent data sources to estimate Gini co-
e cients across countries over time starting from 1820. Their results show
that, apart from very few exceptions (including Japan and South Africa)
the vast majority of countries analysed experienced a major increase in in-
come inequality starting from the 1980s. Interestingly enough, they also
show that between 1820 and 2000 global inequality (i.e. income inequality
as if the world were one country) increased mostly due to rising between-
country inequality rather than within-country inequality. However, “the
exceptions to this pattern are the years leading to 2000, when the increase
in within-country inequality just o↵set the decrease in between-country in-
come inequality”. Finally, they also point out that, within the same long
period of time, global interpersonal income inequality increased by 30%.
In line with these results, a recent report by the OECD (2011) highlights
that the average Gini coe cient for OECD countries increased from 0.29 in
the mid-1980s to 0.316 in the late 2000s: a rise of almost 10%. Put it
di↵erently, in OECD countries, the average income of the richest 10% of
the population is roughly nine times that of the poorest 10%. The same
report concludes that the main explanation for such a dramatic upsurge in
income disparities is to be found in the changing distribution of wages and
salaries, “which account for 75% of household incomes among working-age
1Ortiz and Cummins (2011) use both global and inter-country accounting models to
look at global income distribution under (1) market exchange rates, comparing national
income estimates in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and (2) PPP-adjusted exchange rates.
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adults” (OECD, 2011). Indeed, earnings’ shares at the top have increased
particularly rapidly, whereas those at the bottom have declined steadily
(Atkinson, 2009).
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a historical per-
spective on the role of inequality in economics, starting from the second half
of the last century; Section 3 focuses on the relationship between inequality,
growth and financial stability, a topic of research that has become undoubt-
edly more important after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis in the
United States; Section 4 provides an overview of the main models that have
been used to analyse the issue of inequality and its impact on growth and
stability; Section 5 concludes.
2 Inequality and Economics: a Historical Perspec-
tive
As Pasinetti (2000) points out, the origin of the exploration of distribution
can be traced back to David Ricardo in 1817, whose work “may be taken
as a synthesis of classical theory”. Since then, the literature has been grow-
ing and the link between inequality and growth has been studied in both
directions. Yet, changes in the prevailing economic theory, as well as in the
political and social institutions, have prevented economics to come up with
a shared point of view on this matter.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the debate on the relationship
between inequality and growth in the second half of the twentieth century.
This “short” period of time can be split up in three main time slots based on
the prevailing view. The period from the 50s until the 70s was characterised
by Kuzents’ ideas as well as the contributions by the post-keynasian school
(Kaldor, in particular). In the following period, from the 80s until mid-90s,
less attention was paid to the role of inequality as the prevailing theory of
that time was more concerned with the link between innovation and growth.
This is particularly surprising, since starting from the late 70s income in-
equality, particularly in the United States, started to grow dramatically. In
addition, economic analysis was carried out by means of representative agent
models that ruled out any consideration about distributional issues. Only
starting from the late 90s and the 2000s the economic literature has turned
back to inequality. Eventually, in the wake of the recent financial crisis in
the U.S., some economists have also argued that growing income disparities
should be identified as the main cause of the financial disaster.
Let us go through these stages.
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2.1 1950s-1970s: Kuznets and the Pioneers
In the early 50s, most of the literature dealt with the relationship between
distribution and growth by exploring one direction of causation, that is the
long-run impact of growth on income distribution, while no attention was
paid to the reverse causality.
The most important contribution dating back to that period is the re-
search by Simon Kuznets who, as a matter of fact, tried to find an answer
to the following question: “Does inequality in the distribution of income
increase or decrease in the course of a country’s economic growth?” (1953;
1955). Kuznets provided useful insights on this matter: compared to previ-
ous authors, he based his analysis on an outstanding collection of national
accounting data, as well as fiscal declarations, for the United States over
the period 1913-1948 (Kuznets, 1953). In particular, in his work “Economic
Growth and Income Inequality” (1955) he mainly focused on the e↵ects of
economic development on income distribution in the long run. By means
of a two-sector model, he suggested that income inequality tends to rise in
the early stages of a country’s economic development while it narrows in the
later stages. In particular, as Atkinson (1997) puts it, Kuznets claimed that
“a rise in the proportion employed in the higher income industrial sector
could, on certain assumptions, lead first to rising and then falling overall in-
equality”. This inverted-U relationship, also known as the Kuznets’ curve,
became very popular in the following years thus being the backbone of the
economic literature until the late seventies. For example, since then, several
works have focused on the empirical validation of the inverted-U hypothesis,
with results that both support and reject it.2
In the same period, however, a di↵erent branch of the literature focused
on aspects related to the functional distribution of income and its determi-
nants. Such contributions came from the (post-)Keynasian school of thought
that was particularly concerned with the direction of income distribution and
the way the factors of production are remunerated. In particular, Kaldor
(1955) built a “Keynesian” theory of distribution based upon the works by
Harrod (1939; 1948) and Domar (1946). Put it simply, the major contri-
bution of the post-Keynesian school is the so-called “Cambridge Equation”:
⇡ = g/sp, where ⇡ is the rate of profits, g is the natural growth rate and
sp is the average propensity to save of capitalists. This equation determines
the distributive shares of profits and wages, challenging the neo-classical
view that factors of production are remunerated at their marginal product.
In particular, in their view, the category of profits “is determined in first
instance, by the requirements of the accumulation necessary to sustain the
given growth of the working population and the given growth of productiv-
ity” (Pasinetti, 2000). Eventually, wages are determined as a residual.3
2Galor and Tsiddon (1996) provide a list of both types of works.
3Note that this Kaldorian theory of distribution reverses the causality suggested by
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2.2 1980s: Neoclassical Economics Strikes Back
Post-keynesian contributions did not succeed in gaining long-lasting at-
tention. Indeed in the late 1970s emerging economic problems such as
stagflation, together with the inability of policymakers to react to supply
shocks, yielded a spectacular policy failure that carried with it the Keynesian
paradigm which was eventually left aside.
Starting from the 80s, economists neglected the role of distributional
matters, thereby shifting their focus towards other issues. The rational ex-
pectations revolution, started by Lucas (1973, 1976), contributed to bringing
back to the top the essence of the old neoclassical model. As a matter of
fact, in that period, the emerging typology of models dealt with the issue
of “how technical progress may not only be received from external sources,
but could itself be produced by an economic activity explicitly targeted on
it” (Pasinetti, 2000). Hence, as pointed out also by Stern (1991), the role
of inequality became a less prominent topic in the “endogenous growth”
models developed in the 80s: they were built as inter-temporal optimisa-
tion problems a´ la Ramsey, featuring infinitely-lived and perfectly rational
representative agents who maximise an objective function under some con-
straints. As a result of such “micro-foundations”, this typology of models
rules out the role of distribution and inequality. As Pasinetti (2000) puts it:
Among whom could income be distributed, if it always and
entirely goes to the same ’representative’ individual? Of course,
it could go to the same individual in di↵erent forms; for exam-
ple as wages and/or as profits. But to this distinction, if the
’representative’ individual pockets all, it becomes di cult, or at
any rate problematic, to find any significance. It is in fact the
same individual who, by acting with maximising behaviour, will
have her income emerging as profit or as wage according as to
which is more appropriate for the maximisation of the utility
and production functions. In other words, whether the income
is received in one form or in the other becomes a consequence of
the maximising process. Once again, the characteristics of the
income distribution become purely secondary, which is a logical
consequence of a basically neoclassical scheme.
The issues highlighted by Pasinetti were valid for the 90s but they have
a certain relevance even today. As a matter of fact, Atkinson claims that
in the past, “changes in income distribution have often been dismissed as
too insignificant to be worth attention” (1997). Also Piketty (2013) stresses
Ricardo who believed that wages are determined first, whereas wages come afterwards.
Further details about the controversy between Neoricardians and Post-Keynesians can be
found in the discussion between P. Garegnani and J. Robinson in the Cambridge Journal
of Economics in 1978-1979 (Garegnani, 1978, 1979a,b; Robinson, 1979)
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that for a long period of time, economists have ignored distributional issues
“partly because of Kuznets’s optimistic conclusions and partly because of the
profession’s undue enthusiasm for simplistic mathematical models based on
the so-called representative agents”. Mian and Sufi (2014) argue that income
and wealth distribution matters when dealing with macroeconomic issues
but this is not taken into account by most of the economists as they adopt the
representative-agent modelling framework that drops all the distributional
considerations.
2.3 1990s: Inequality Gets Back on the Agenda
Starting from the mid-1990s, the role of distributional issues has come back
on top of the agenda. Bourguignon (1996) claims that “distribution is again
seen as an important dimension of development” and he also mentions a
number of studies that “seem to confirm the significance of the statistical
link between growth and inequality”.
For example, at the World Bank, Deininger and Squire (1996) compile
a new dataset of Gini coe cients and other measures of distribution for
108 countries. In their paper the authors re-examine the interactions be-
tween growth and inequality and their e↵ects on poverty reduction. To this
purpose, they use two new datasets focusing on income inequality and the
distribution of land (a proxy for assets). This latter provides a better mea-
sure of initial allocation since information on the distribution of land in 1960
is available for a much larger number of countries. Deininger and Squire also
incorporate some inter-temporal elements into the analysis of Kuznets, in
contrast to past e↵orts that relied on cross-country information. Their main
finding is that initial income inequality is not a robust determinant of future
growth, while land inequality (i.e. the distribution of original assets) has a
significant and negative impact on overall growth. Reduced inequality is
therefore important, because it might modify, possibly positively, the future
rate of growth (Bourguignon, 1996).
Hence, the main focus of the literature was on the inequality-growth
causality, since “the central concern does not basically consist any more
in considering the degree of income inequality as the result of economic
growth in the long run (and more exactly as the consequence of the level of
development) but mainly focuses on the role of the distribution of income
and wealth in the process of economic growth.” (Ehrhart, 2009). That is,
“the present debate on the relationship between inequality and growth is
based on the idea that, through di↵erent channels, equality may serve as an
engine for growth” (Bourguignon, 1996).
Deininger and Squire’s results (see also Deininger and Squire, 1998) give
new impulse and empirical justification to a theoretical literature that in-
troduces rigidities in the standard representative agent model, thus bringing
back income distribution in macroeconomic and growth models. A typical
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example is the two-period model by Galor and Zeira (1993) (see also Aghion
et al. 1999): in such a model, the capacity of individuals to invest in human
capital and acquire and improve skills is constrained by their initial endow-
ment, which therefore impacts investment in the short run and productivity
in the long run. In a more recent example, Cingano (2014) stresses the nega-
tive link between income inequality and growth via insu cient accumulation
of human capital.
The impact of inequality is also analysed in the presence of imperfect
capital/credit markets. Two important contributions, namely Aghion and
Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997), show that an increase in inequality worsen
the credit constraint that agents face “and thereby reducing the possibil-
ity for poor agents to cross the threshold of wealth needed to become en-
trepreneurs” (Colombo and Dri ll, 2003).
Aghion and Bolton (1997) introduces inequality in a model with imper-
fect capital markets in order to analyse the trickle-down e↵ect of capital
accumulation. The authors find that the process of capital accumulation
has a widening e↵ect on inequality in the early stages, thus inverting the
trend in the later ones. In addition, they also show that the redistribution
of wealth from rich lenders to poor borrowers results in greater equality of
opportunities and it also accelerates the trickle-down process thereby im-
proving production e ciency.
Piketty (1997) extends the standard Solow model with the introduction
of imperfect credit markets. This allows to overcome the irrelevance of
wealth distribution in the original setting, as the resulting credit rationing
may upset the relationship between interest rates and the marginal product
of capital. The model shows that higher interest rates result in lower long
run capital accumulation as credit-constrained individuals need long time
to rebuild their capital.
Another strand of the literature describes the impact of inequality on
growth by focusing on the political economy channel. As a matter of fact,
Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that a highly unequal distribution of income
and wealth entails social tensions and increases political instability. This in
turn can lead to sub-optimal investment, jeopardising the ability of political
systems to respond e↵ectively to external shocks: a greater share of resources
is dedicated to bargaining over the distribution of rents, thus threatening
the security of property rights, and discouraging capital accumulation. In
a related contribution, Alesina and Rodrick (1994) build a model showing
that excessive inequality may lead the median voter to opt for higher tax
rates that, being distortionary, in turn reduce incentives for investment and
long term growth.
As far as inequality gets back on the agenda, the economic literature
in the ’90s did not challenge the key aspects of the dominant paradigm.
Indeed, most works still assume that frictionless markets work e ciently
and factors are remunerated at their marginal product. As such, income
16
distribution needs not to be a policy objective. In addition, when markets
are not well-functioning, optimality can be restored by means of structural
reforms that aim at eliminating frictions. Hence, income redistribution may
be accepted only as long as it does not introduce further distortions, thereby
remaining a second best option.
3 Inequality and Financial Instability
In the late 2000s, after the outbreak of the financial crisis a growing number
of economists argued that there exists a link between the reported major
widening of income disparities and the jeopardisation of financial stability
(Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013; Fitoussi, 2013; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011;
Frank et al., 2014; Galbraith, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012, 2013; Van Treeck, 2012).
This argument gave impulse to the emergence of an empirical literature
debating the relationship between inequality and economic crises. Yet, con-
trasting positions have emerged. For example, Bordo and Meissner (2012)
find strong evidence that credit booms lead to banking and financial crises
but no significant evidence that such booms are a result of changes in in-
come concentration. This is in line with Atkinson and Morelli (2011), who
claim that there is limited support for the hypothesis of causality between
variations in income inequality and economic crises. As a matter of fact,
by collecting data for the period 1911-2010 in 25 countries, the authors find
that inequality rose prior to only 6 out of 22 banking crises and 9 out of
24 macroeconomic crises. However, Atkinson and Morelli (2011) point out
that both their work and that by Bordo and Meissner (2012) focus only
on the relationship between crises and changes in income distribution: “we
have not investigated whether inequality level was relatively higher before
identified macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, the level hypothesis cannot be
ruled out at this stage” (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). Hence, as an attempt
to provide a more complete analysis, Malinen (2013) extends the work by
Bordo and Meissner (2012) by evaluating also the relationship between in-
equality levels and leverage. The author finds a long-run causal link between
income inequality and increased leverage in the economy.
Despite the importance of these empirical contributions, there have been
few economic models showing how inequality can generate a greater risk of
crisis as stressed by Atkinson and Morelli (2011): in the case of financial
crises, most accounts of their origins give no role to distributional consid-
erations. For example, “the indexes to three authoritative studies of finan-
cial crises, by Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Krugman (2009) and Rein-
hart and Rogo↵ (2009), contain neither inequality nor income distribution”
(Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). Similarly, the FCIC (2011) in its final report
on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the United States does
not mention inequality at all. Also Galbraith (2012) argues that before the
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crisis the relationship between inequality and financial instability was not
even thought of, as there was no study of the link between the two.
One may reasonably wonder why the link between inequality and fi-
nancial instability has been ignored for so long. To answer that question,
Van Treeck (2012) points out economics has fostered the belief that peo-
ple can make an e cient use of credit markets to insure against temporary
fluctuations of income. Thus, several prominent economists have come to
underestimate the relevance of growing inequality (after all, Lucas (2004)
a Nobel prize winner, thought that nothing is as poisonous to sound eco-
nomics as “to focus on questions of distribution”4). In fact, in 1996 the
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, held a speech in
which he stressed that variations in asset holdings and debt bu↵er changes
in income: in his view, this explains why the well-being of the lower-income
segments of society had not worsened that much by looking at consumption
from the late 1960s, even in the face of growing income disparities (1996).
Greenspan’s interpretation of the data stems from Friedman’s Permanent
Income Hypothesis (1957): consumption choices are largely determined by
a change in permanent income rather than in temporary income and “even
with a higher variability in the transitory component of income, consumption
can be smoothed through lending and borrowing in the presence of e cient
credit markets” (Van Treeck, 2012).
Van Treeck blames this view for being unable to establish a proper link
between rising inequality on the one hand and the fall in the aggregate
saving rate together with rising household indebtedness on the other hand.
Krueger and Perri (2006) bring about further evidence: they find a strong
correlation between the ratio of unsecured consumer credit to disposable
income and the Gini coe cient. Based on this result, they conclude, con-
sumers made stronger use of credit markets “exactly when they needed to
(starting in the mid-1970s), in order to insulate consumption from bigger
income fluctuations”.
In other words, the optimistic point of view of Greenspan and others
suggests that credit markets worked e ciently by compensating for rising
income inequality. However, by looking at the recent financial disaster one
may reasonably wonder whether this confident position is well grounded.
Indeed, there is a growing consensus in the literature that financial and
economic stability was jeopardised not only by the development of bizarre
financial instruments, but also by a more structural real factor: income
inequality could, and in fact did, play a role in boosting the risk of a crisis.
A comprehensive explanation links inequality, financial instability and
4More precisely, Lucas (2004) claims: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound
economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on
questions of distributions.” He also adds that “the potential for improving the lives of poor
people by finding di↵erent ways of distributing current production is nothing compared
to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production”.
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global macroeconomic imbalances.
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010, 2011) argue that the root causes of the
crisis are to be found in the structural weakness of the world economy in
2007, caused by the progressive accumulation of imbalances of opposite sign
in di↵erent areas of the world. Prior to the crisis, the United States had
an excess of demand over domestic production, o↵set by an increasingly
big trade deficit (which in 2006 peaked at almost 6 percent of GDP) which
was financed by the excess savings that, with di↵erent causes, characterised
other regions of the world for more than a decade. In China and in other
East Asian countries, the lack of a proper welfare state, as well as a reliable
financial system, yielded an excess of precautionary savings for businesses
and households. In addition, after the 1997 crisis, policy authorities in
these countries started to accumulate reserves to deal with possible sudden
stops (like the one of 1998). In Europe, instead, excess savings were being
caused by the inertia of economic policy authorities and by low investment
rates, which depressed demand and income, so as to force the economy to
rely on export-led growth alone. These opposite imbalances compensated
each other for almost two decades, resulting in an apparently stable global
balance. However, the crisis proved it to be fragile. What role did inequality
play in this pattern?
Building on Kaldor’s (1955) framework, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010,
2011) as well as Stiglitz (2012) and Fitoussi (2013), put forward a theory
linking inequality, aggregate demand, monetary policy and financial bub-
bles. They stress two main points: (1) rising inequality is the main source
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis; and (2) rising inequality goes together with
structural weaknesses of aggregate demand. The mechanism is straightfor-
ward: starting from an equilibrium position, with supply equal to demand,
a transfer of income from low/middle-income households to rich ones, who
have a lower propensity to consume, results in higher savings and therefore
a lower aggregate demand, thus pushing the economy into a recession. The
institutional framework then plays a key role. If monetary authorities step
in by implementing an expansionary policy (often accompanied by lax reg-
ulation), they stimulate the economy and sustain consumption for a while.
Indeed, by lowering the interest rate, the central bank facilitates household
access to credit markets thereby increasing the level of private debt. There-
fore, as highlighted by Galbraith (2012), the link between radical inequality
and financial crisis runs precisely through private debt.
The mechanism introduced above is a suitable explanation for the events
that took place in the United States before and during the 2007-2008 finan-
cial crisis. The expansionary monetary policy implemented by the Federal
Reserve in the 2000s successfully pushed low and middle-income households
to increase their private consumption faster than their disposable income
by borrowing (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010). However, the other side of the
story is that the incredibly small part of the American society who ben-
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efited from higher inequality needed to find a way to profitably use their
newly accumulated savings: “a huge pool of available financial capital - the
product of increased inequality - went in search of profitable opportunities
in which to invest” (Milanovic, 2010). As stressed by the CJEC (2010), the
ever-richer wealthy started to invest their amassed sums of money in new
financial products, prompted by bank deregulation that allowed for the de-
velopment of exotic financial instruments. With the mediation of mortgage
companies, ratings agencies, investment banks, government-sponsored en-
terprises and the derivatives markets, the rich 1% lent to the remaining 99%
thereby contributing to net wealth overvaluation with rising asset prices well
above their real value and to the emergence of bubbles. For a while, this gave
the false impression that high levels of debt were sustainable (Fitoussi and
Saraceno, 2010). Eventually the bubble exploded and net wealth returned
to normal levels. The crisis revealed itself because the terms of credit were
built upon the intrinsic instabilities involved in lending to those who cannot
pay: “like any Ponzi scheme, or any bubble, it is a matter of timing: those
who are in and out early do well and those who are not nimble always go
bust” (Galbraith, 2012). Hence, even though the crisis emerged in the fi-
nancial sector, “its roots are much deeper and lie in a structural change in
income distribution that had been going on for twenty-five years” (Fitoussi
and Saraceno, 2010). Also Iacoviello (2008) points out that the increase in
household debt, the large widening of wealth inequality and the relative sta-
bility of consumption inequality can all be explained by the rise in income
inequality of the 1980s and the 1990s. Similarly, Frank et al. (2014) find a
strong link between inequality and household indebtedness, by predicting a
clear relationship between income inequality and observed savings rates.
3.1 Inequality, Household Debt and the Housing Market
Higher inequality results in a major amount of wealth accumulated by the
richest 1% who want to use it for profitable investment. As a result, the
financial sector is “overwhelmed by the volume of funds seeking investment
relative to profit opportunities in the productive sector” (Perugini et al.,
2013) thus becoming more reckless. So, as Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) put
it, those who benefit from higher inequality search for high-return invest-
ment thereby leading to the emergence of market bubbles. This is created
via strong house price appreciation, “fueled by the availability of mortgage
credit to a riskier set of new home buyers” (Mian and Sufi, 2009). That
is, under the pressure of reckless rich households, and thanks to deregula-
tion and loosen monetary policies, banks and financial intermediaries seek
for profitable opportunities in the housing market by supplying mortgage
credit not only to trustworthy new home buyers but also to risky ones. This
results in growing demand for houses and therefore higher house prices.
As pointed out by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), house
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prices grew considerably due to lower interest rates and greater access to
mortgage credit for households who had traditionally been left out. Ev-
idence of higher credit availability to poorer people is reported in Mian
and Sufi (2009) who show that subprime ZIP codes experienced an un-
precedented relative growth in mortgage credit. However, such expansion in
mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime ZIP codes occurred despite
sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in
these neighborhoods. That is, income growth and credit growth are statisti-
cally significantly negatively correlated from 2002 to 2005. This shows that
more credit was available where people were relatively poorer.
Mian and Sufi (2009) stress that strong house price appreciation has an
“important feedback e↵ect on household leverage through existing home-
owners” as higher house prices lead to a higher value of their home equity.
Mian and Sufi (2009) refer to this as home equity-based borrowing (HEBB).
HEBB was a key mechanism that contributed to the dramatic rise of private
debt in the United States.5 Indeed, since “credit standards and the cost of
external finance are determined by considering the value of households col-
lateral, which is influenced by housing prices” (Arestis and Gonzalez, 2013),
as home prices rise, homeowners with greater equity feel more financially
secure and, partly as a result, save less and less. Many others go one step
further, borrowing against the equity. The e↵ect is unprecedented debt
(FCIC, 2011).
In addition to this, it is crucial to understand what households do with
the amount of credit they get. As reported in the Fed’s 2004 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, ”45% of homeowners who tapped their equity used that
money for expenses such as medical bills, taxes, electronics, and vacations,
or to consolidate debt; another 31% used it for home improvements; and
the rest purchased more real estate, cars, investments, clothing, or jewelry”
(FCIC, 2011). Also Mian and Sufi (2009) show that a large fraction of
HEBB is used to finance consumption (or home improvement). Therefore
the HEBB channel can provide “a quantitative explanation for the decline in
the US saving rates previous to the financial crisis” (Mian and Sufi, 2009).
New financial products like the home equity line of credit allowed house-
holds to borrow against their homes to compensate for investment losses or
unemployment (FCIC, 2011).
3.2 The Politics of Inequality
In identifying the link between rising inequality and the financial crisis,
Stiglitz (2013) puts particular emphasis on the functioning of the American
system which, in his view, “has been working overtime to move money from
5Notice that 65% of U.S. households already owned a house before house prices started
to rise so fast in the late 1990s (Mian and Sufi, 2009). This stresses the importance of the
HEBB channel.
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the bottom and middle to the top, but the system is so ine cient that the
gains to the top are far less than the losses to the middle and bottom”.
As a result of such growing and huge inequality, the economy pays a high
price in terms of slower growth, lower GDP and even more instability. In
other words, there is a vicious circle in that “a weak economy (one with a
low aggregate demand) leads to higher inequality which in turn leads to a
weaker economy, and so on” (Stiglitz, 2013).
Hacker and Pierson (2010), Galbraith (2012) and Stiglitz (2013) point
out that the increase of inequality in the past decades has been due mostly to
the rise of predatory behavior rather than fundamentals, like globalization
and technological progress. Precisely because the elites have gained more
than a fair share of national wealth, rising inequality has hampered well-
being and distorted the economy. The rise of rent-seeking and predatory
behaviour has coincided with the paramount role played by an increasingly
deregulated financial sector, where the distance between wages and marginal
productivity quickly became noticeable. Empirical evidence also seems to
discard the traditional view. A recent work by Ostry et al. (2014) shows
that there is a robust negative correlation between inequality and growth and
that countries which implement redistributive policies tend to grow faster.
Emphasising rent-seeking behaviour (Ga↵ard and Saraceno, 2014) helps ex-
plaining why the increase of income inequality in the past decades benefited
incomes at the top level (Atkinson et al., 2011). More importantly, it also
highlights the importance of policy choices. The economic power of the elites
and the conservative revolution in politics mutually reinforced each other,
leading to increasingly less progressive tax systems and to a downsizing of
the welfare state (Creel and Saraceno, 2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010). For
the same reasons, the usual response to reduced aggregate demand is a mon-
etary expansion rather than a fiscal one. As a matter of fact Stiglitz (2012)
suggests that political reasons matter in this case:
High inequality is often accompanied by a demand for a smaller
government and more fiscal restraint. (...) Policies are often af-
fected by lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving doors,
so that the wealthy have disproportionate influence. Thus, as in-
equality grows, at least in many countries, so too do constraints
on the governments fiscal space.
Following the same line, Rajan (2010) emphasises in particular the role of
government failure by claiming that “the political response to rising inequal-
ity whether carefully planned or an unpremeditated reaction to constituent
demands was to expand lending to households, especially low-income ones”,
so as to end up with rising household debt.
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4 Economic Models
As already pointed out, an increasing number of works has focused on the
link between inequality and growth, even though a few of these have dealt
with the impact that growing income disparities play in increasing the like-
lihood of a financial crisis.
Di↵erent approaches have been used in the macroeconomic literature:
• standard New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models;
• Post-Keynesian Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) models;
• Macro Agent-Based (AB) Models with heterogenous interacting agents.
Let us summarise the key findings of such contributions, starting from
those based on DSGE models. Among the most relevant and discussed works
in the recent literature we find those by Kumhof and his coauthors.
Kumhof et al. (2015) aim at showing how high leverage and economic
crises can stem from changing income distributions. They build a standard
DSGE model in which financial assets are backed by loans to workers: as a
result of higher inequality (modelled as a shock to the relative bargaining
powers of the two income groups), investors contribute to the emergence of
a bubble as they use part of their increased income to buy more of such
assets. As a consequence, workers can limit their drop in consumption but
find themselves with higher debt-to-income ratios. The result of this process
is higher financial fragility that eventually leads to an economic crisis.
In a more recent work, Kumhof et al. (2012) carry out an empirical anal-
ysis of the link between increases in income inequality and current account
imbalances, thus showing that a substantial part of the observed current
account deteriorations in deficit countries (e.g. United States, United King-
dom) is accounted for by the dramatic rise in inequality. Moreover, Kumhof
et al. (2012) build a two-country DSGE model in order to study the mecha-
nism at work in these economies. Similarly to Kumhof et al. (2015), workers
in one country are able to smooth consumption, even in the face of rising
income disparities, because of loans coming from both domestic and foreign
investors. Workers in the other country do not have access to credit markets
and as such they cannot borrow. Therefore, two kind of economies emerge in
the model: a borrowing-economy with greater household debt and a current
account deficit and a lending-economy where investors deploy their funds
abroad thereby resulting in a current account surplus.
Tirelli and Motta (2012) focus on the “causality link between long-run in-
equality and macroeconomic volatility”. In particular, they build a medium-
scale DSGE model with limited asset market participation and agents that
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are endowed with di↵erent wealth holdings. By including external con-
sumption habits, they manage to capture concern for relative consumption
in agents’ preferences so as to show that “redistributive polices targeting
consumption inequality have beneficial implications for macroeconomic sta-
bility”.
Iacoviello (2008) builds a DSGE model with heterogenous agents which
traces the link between growing inequality and higher household debt. In
particular, he finds that “the cyclicality of debt primarily reflects the behav-
ior of credit constrained agents, whose credit constraints get relaxed in good
times, thus allowing them to borrow more”. As a consequence, according
to the author, the rise in income inequality in the period between 1980s
and 1990s is the main factor behind “the increase in household debt, the
large widening of wealth inequality, and the relative stability of consumption
inequality”.
Another contribution addressing the impact of inequality on output and
employment is the paper by Charpe and Kuhn (2012) which builds a stan-
dard DSGE model with a search and matching component with Nash bar-
gaining over income distribution. The paper shows that a decline in workers’
bargaining power results in a lower labour share of income and as such leads
to lower consumption and aggregate demand. The authors thus suggest
that the implementation of a minimum wage policy might limit the drop in
output and employment, so as to challenge the standard conclusion of New
Keynesian DSGE models which usually find virtue to wage moderation.
This contrasting result has been achieved by reinforcing the “transmission
channel from income distribution to consumption decisions by combining
rule-of-thumb households and nominal price rigidities. This transmission is
strengthened in the presence of the zero lower bound in monetary policy”.
The Post-Keynesian literature has recently started to focus on the appli-
cation of SFC models to the issue of inequality and its impact of growth and
financial stability. Two key contributions within this literature are those by
Zezza (2008) and Van Treeck (2013).
Zezza (2008) notices that household propensity to save out of income
in the United States has decreased markedly starting from the ’80s. Hence
he builds a SFC growth model with integrated real and financial markets
to show that the increase in private expenditure relative to income, in the
face of growing inequality, is explained by the rise in household debt and
the dynamics that took place in the housing market. Results show that
changing income distribution in favour of the top implies that “growth will
be faster as the propensity to save drops, but the increase in the stock of
mortgages relative to disposable income puts the economy into a potentially
unstable growth path” (Zezza, 2008).
Van Treeck (2013) follows the same line of research as Kumhof et al.
(2012): the paper develops a three-country SFC model to assess the impact
of changing income distribution on current account imbalances. However,
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compared to Kumhof et al. (2012), the model features three country (cal-
ibrated as the United States, Germany and China) and deals with both
personal and functional income distribution. In addition, it also includes
upward-looking comparisons in household demand for consumption, based
on the relative income hypothesis. Results show that the substantial in-
crease in household debt in the United States, as well as the decline in their
current account since the early ’80s, “can be explained by the interplay of
rising (top-end) household income inequality and institutions”.
The literature on macroeconomic agent-based models has been growing
fast in the recent years. By using this approach, economists can model the
economy as a complex system populated by heterogenous interacting agents.
This is a big advantage when dealing with matters of (personal) distribution.
In addition, it is possible to model credit networks among households (or
firms) and banks and thus taking into account the consequences of a small
number of defaults, which represent a negative externality that might impact
the dynamics of the whole system due to the presence of feedback e↵ects
among di↵erent agents. Let us introduce the key works on inequality based
on macroeconomic agent-based models.
Dosi et al. (2013) study the link between income inequality and mon-
etary/fiscal policies in an agent-based model, which features “Keynesian
mechanisms of demand generation, a Schumpeterian innovation-fueled pro-
cess of growth and Minskian credit dynamics”. They model the economy as
an “ecology of heterogenous agents whose far-from-equilibrium interactions
continuously change the structure of the system itself”. Their result shows
that countries with more unequal societies su↵er from more severe busi-
ness cycles fluctuations as well as higher unemployment rates and higher
likelihood of crises. As a consequence, they find that fiscal policies might
reduce the magnitude of business cycle oscillations and, in some cases, have
a positive impact on long-term growth.
Russo et al. (2015) focus on the impact of growing inequality on financial
stability. Their agent based model simulates a simple credit economy (with
non-collateralised loans) that links households and banks thus leading to the
endogenous emergence of credit networks. The work concludes that higher
inequality jeopardises economic stability: higher household debt results in a
greater number of defaults that impacts the availability of credit for future
borrowers. As a result, consumption smoothing by poorer households cannot
take place and aggregate demand and output fall.
The contribution by Carvalho and Di Guilmi (2014) combines a SFC
model with an agent-based sector. This innovative approach allows to pro-
vide some micro-foundations to fully aggregate SFC models, thus capturing
bottom-up dynamics as in the tradition of AB models. In particular they
introduce heterogeneous agents into a demand-driven stock-flow consistent
model with endogenous credit creation in order to study the dynamics of
both the personal and the functional distribution of income and their im-
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pact on household debt and aggregate demand. Their results show that the
functional and the personal distributions of income, jointly with the inter-
est rate, are key factors in determining the degree of financial fragility and
debt sustainability. As a policy conclusion, they suggest that a rise in the
minimum wage negatively impact debt-to-income ratios as well as the de-
gree of financialisation of the economy. Moreover, they find that a reduction
in wage inequality further contributes to leading the economy toward more
sustainable paths in both household debt and the degree of financialisation.
5 Conclusions
By providing an extensive analysis of both the theoretical and the empirical
literature on inequality, this paper shows how this topic has been analysed
by economists starting from the second half of the nineteenth century. Our
historical perspective highlights that income distribution was a key issue for
the economic profession for decades. Eventually, starting from the 80s, the
topic entered a phase of declining interest. The issue of inequality has been
ignored for so long due to several reasons, most importantly due to Kuznetss
optimistic conclusions (Piketty, 2013), the emergence of new mathematical
models based upon the representative agent postulate (Mian and Sufi, 2014;
Piketty, 2013), and the belief that people can make an e cient use of credit
markets to insure against temporary fluctuations of income (Van Treeck,
2012). However, inequality has come back on top of the agenda only in the
recent years. A key factor for the renewed interest in distributional issues
is the recent financial crisis. The works by some prominent economists
have indeed suggested a strong link between rising income disparities and
the instability of the financial and economic system. In presence of highly
financialised systems with articulated credit markets, households have been
able to increase their private consumption even with stagnant income growth
over much of the distribution. The consequence has been the dramatic rise
in household debt that has eventually led to the collapse of credit and the
recession.
In spite of useful insights on this matter, most of the works provide the-
oretical suggestions that are not supported by means of formal and rigorous
modelling. Moreover, the models built so far either lie in the representa-
tive agent framework (as in the DSGE litetarature), or do not consider the
interaction between rising inequality, household debt dynamics in the pres-
ence of articulated credit and housing markets. In addition, it seems that
policy conclusions rarely focus on the need for a structural reform with a
more progressive taxations system to tackle increasing inequality. Our two
models, presented in the next two works of this Ph.D. thesis represent a first
attempt to fill the gap in the existing literature.
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Abstract
Our paper contributes to the literature on the causes of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis in the U.S.. By means of an Agent-Based Model,
we argue that growing inequality and the resulting debt-financed con-
sumption boom jeopardised the stability of the economic system, thus
paving the way for the financial crisis as suggested by Cynamon and
Fazzari (2013); Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010); Stiglitz (2012). Our
model includes a behavioural rule for consumption based on expen-
diture cascades, a hierarchical structure of household finance, an artic-
ulated credit market with collateralised consumption loans and mort-
gages and a simple housing market. Results show that the model is
able to capture the economic and social pressure of inequality on low
and middle income households that pushes them to increase their con-
sumption via home equity-based borrowing as described by Mian and
Sufi (2009). Rising non-performing loans lead to higher bad debt on
banks’ balance sheets and, consequently, to the emergence of a crisis
as an endogenous dynamic.
Keywords: Agent-Based Models, Equity Extraction, Household
Debt, Inequality
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus in the literature that financial and economic
stability in the U.S. was jeopardised not only by the development of bizarre
financial instruments, but also by a more structural real factor, namely
income inequality which could, and in fact did, play a role in boosting the
risk of a crisis (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2013; Fitoussi, 2013; Fitoussi and
Saraceno, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012, 2013).
In the period between 1983 and 2007, the income share of the top 5% in
the U.S. increased from 22% to 34% (Kumhof and Rancie`re, 2010). More-
over, the top 1% of the population doubled its share in national income from
around 8% in the mid-1970s to almost 16% in the early 2000s (Milanovic,
2010). This transfer of income from the bottom of the distribution to the
top reproduced the same situation that existed prior to the 1929 crisis, when
the share of the top 1% reached its previous high-water mark. One would
expect the transfer of income from the bottom to the top to reduce overall
consumer demand thus leading to unemployment and stagnation in gen-
eral since the richest part of the population is assumed to have a lower
propensity to consume (Kaldor, 1955). Still, in the years before the crisis,
the U.S. economy performed well as American households, in the aggregate,
increased their spending relative to income: using an adjusted measure of
demand relative to adjusted disposable income of the household sector, Faz-
zari and Cynamon (2013) show that rising inequality, starting roughly in the
early 1980s, corresponds unequivocally with a historic increase in American
household demand relative to income from roughly 81% to almost 95%. The
authors refer to this as a paradox and they wonder how consumption spend-
ing could rise so quickly in the face of stagnant growth over much of the
income distribution. The answer is that “American households, outside of
those in the top of the income distribution, went on an extended borrowing
binge” (Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013): household debt increased from 48%
of GDP in the early 1980s to 100% of GDP before the crisis (Milanovic,
2010). Hence, the observed drop in the propensity to save can be explained
by the higher debt to income ratio and percentage of consumption financed
by borrowing, as pointed out also by Zezza (2008).
Starting from these key facts, two major issues are worth analysing:
one is about the reasons that pushed household debt to increase to such
unsustainable levels; the other one is about the mechanisms that actually
allowed households to borrow with virtually no constraints. The former can
be traced back to the dramatic rise in income inequality in a context of peer
e↵ects in consumption, while the latter is explained by house price dynamics
which made equity extraction a viable option for households (FCIC, 2011).
Hence, we build a macro agent-based model (ABM) with the ultimate goal of
assessing the impact of income inequality on household debt dynamics and
financial stability in the presence of expenditure cascades (Frank et al., 2014)
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and home-equity based borrowing (Mian and Sufi, 2014) by households.
1.1 Related Literature
In the period before (and during) the recent U.S. financial crisis, only a very
few number of studies focused on the link between rising income inequality
and the increase in household debt. Most of the studies, in particular,
ignored the role these facts may have played in increasing the risk of financial
instability. Galbraith (2012) argues that before the crisis the relationship
between inequality and financial instability was not even thought of, as there
was no study of the link between the two. Also Atkinson and Morelli (2011)
stress that there have been few economic models showing how inequality
can generate a greater risk of crisis.
In the aftermath of the crisis, however, some relevant contributions in
this area have emerged. One of the key works is the paper by Kumhof
et al. (2015) who build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model showing how greater inequality (modelled as a shock to the relative
bargaining powers of the two income groups) results in asset price appre-
ciation that eventually leads to the emergence of a financial bubble. Yet,
the representative agent framework, a peculiarity of DSGE models, does
not allow to capture either heterogeneity among agents or the existence of
emerging credit networks. In addition, the model does not include a proper
financial/banking sector, as all the borrowing-lending transactions occur be-
tween rich (lenders) and poor (borrowers) households. As a consequence,
it is impossible to take into account the impact of household defaults on
the balance sheets of the banking system and the possible resulting credit
crunch.
Given the drawbacks of DSGE models, we explore the issue of inequality
and financial instability by adopting a macroeconomic agent-based model,
as in Dosi et al. (2013), Russo et al. (2015) and Erlingsson et al. (2013). Our
paper, in fact, shares some similarities with such works, in particular with
Russo et al. (2015) who focus on the impact of growing inequality on financial
stability. Dosi et al. (2013) study the link between income inequality and
monetary/fiscal policies in an agent-based model, which features “Keyne-
sian mechanisms of demand generation, a Schumpeterian innovation-fueled
process of growth and Minskian credit dynamics”. Erlingsson et al. (2013),
instead, do not focus on inequality. Rather, they model a credit economy
where housing market bubbles and financial crises emerge endogenously as
a result of agents’ interactions. There is a clear common approach between
such works and ours, in modelling the economy as a credit network in which
agents, either firms or households, have access to bank loans. Yet, compared
to the others, our model allows households to interact with heterogeneous
banks in order to apply for both consumption loans and mortgages. Indeed,
similar to Erlingsson et al. (2013), we introduce also a simple housing mar-
35
ket that allows for the endogenous dynamics of house prices (a feature that
is present neither in Dosi et al., 2013, nor in Russo et al., 2015). This is
a relevent element of our work since consumption loans and mortgages are
collateralised and as such asset price formation is a key mechanism for the
functioning of the credit market. Another distinctive feature of our work
is the introduction of imitation and peer e↵ects in household consumption
through upward-looking comparisons, consistent with the behavioural liter-
ature (e.g. Frank et al., 2014 and Cynamon and Fazzari, 2013). None of the
works mentioned above has a similar mechanism.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the theory linking
inequality to higher household debt and house price dynamics; Section 3
describes our ABM; Section 4 reports simulation results; finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 Inequality, Equity Extraction and the Borrow-
ing Binge
In the years before the crisis, as a result of increasing inequality, income
growth outside the top quintile was stagnant (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2013;
Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013). Yet, demand remained strong and contributed
to the good performance of the American economy. This counterintuitive
fact may be explained by looking at micro and macro aspects of economic
theory, ranging from household imitative behaviour to house price dynamics.
Let us start from micro-foundations. As Cynamon and Fazzari (2013)
point out, the literature on social psychology provides useful insights: “house-
holds learn consumption patterns from their social reference group”. As
such, they tend to compare their living standard, proxied by their level of
consumption, with that of their neighbours or richer households. Hence,
growing income disparities lead to the observed decline in the savings rates
of American households through expenditure cascades (Frank et al., 2014):
“a process whereby increased expenditure by some people leads others just
below them on the income scale to spend more as well, in turn leading others
just below the second group to spend more, and so on”. In fact, following
the rise in income inequality households at the bottom of the distribution
looked for external resources to finance their growing desired consumption:
they accessed credit markets to borrow.
Turning to macro dynamics, higher inequality contributed to booming
household debt via the real estate market and equity extraction processes.
On the one hand, “a huge pool of available financial capital - the product
of increased inequality - went in search of profitable opportunities in which
to invest” (Milanovic, 2010). On the other hand, the expansionary policy
implemented by the Federal Reserve in the 2000s successfully allowed low
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and middle-income households to increase their private consumption faster
than their disposable income by borrowing (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010).
Lower interest rates in a deregulated environment contributed to strong
house price appreciation, “fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a
riskier set of new home buyers” (Mian and Sufi, 2009). Banks and finan-
cial intermediaries, seeking profitable opportunities in the housing market,
supplied mortgages not only to trustworthy new home buyers but also to
risky ones, namely subprime borrowers. This resulted in growing demand
for houses and therefore higher house prices. Also the Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission (2011) stresses that house prices grew markedly due to
lower interest rates for mortgage borrowers and greater access to mortgage
credit for households who had traditionally been left out (including subprime
borrowers).
House price dynamics have “an important feedback e↵ect on household
leverage through existing homeowners” (Mian and Sufi, 2009), as higher
house prices imply a greater value of home equity that can be extracted for
consumption purposes. Mian and Sufi (2009) refer to this as home equity-
based borrowing (HEBB), claiming that it allowed U.S. homeowners to in-
crease their debt.1 Since “credit standards and the cost of external finance
are determined by considering the value of households collateral, which is
influenced by housing prices” (Arestis and Gonzalez, 2013), as these rose,
homeowners with greater equity felt more financially secure and, partly as
a result, saved less and less. Many others went one step further, borrowing
against their equity. The e↵ect was unprecedented debt (FCIC, 2011).
As highlighted by Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), higher house prices gave
the false impression that high levels of debt were sustainable. Ultimately,
the bubble exploded and net wealth returned to normal levels. The crisis
revealed itself because the terms of credit were built upon the intrinsic insta-
bilities involved in lending to those who cannot pay: “like any Ponzi scheme,
or any bubble, it is a matter of timing: those who are in and out early do
well and those who are not nimble always go bust” (Galbraith, 2012).
3 The Model
For the purpose of our work, we build an agent-based model where the
economy is modelled as an ecology populated by heterogeneous agents whose
interactions continuously change the structure of the system (Fagiolo and
Roventini, 2012). At the micro level, agents repeatedly interact with each
other based on adaptive and imitative behaviours thus giving rise to stable
and predictable aggregate configurations at the macro level (Delli Gatti
1Notice that 65% of U.S. households already owned a house before house prices started
to rise so fast in the late 1990s (Mian and Sufi, 2009). This stresses the importance of the
HEBB channel.
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et al., 2011; Tesfatsion, 2006).
The main goal of our model is to identify the e↵ect of inequality on
household debt and the stability of the economic system as a whole. To
do so, we focus mostly on the household sector and its relationship with
banks. Our economy is demand-driven, that is we assume the existence of a
representative firm, owned by all households, which always satisfies demand:
it supplies the required amount of goods and, as such, no rationing takes
place in the goods market2.
The structure of our model has some key features that allow to capture
the dynamics described in the previous section of this paper. Such key
features are:
• The introduction of a consumption behaviour based on an imitative be-
haviour as described by the Expenditure Cascades Hypothesis (Frank
et al., 2014), so as to capture the economic and social pressure of
inequality on low and middle income households;
• A hierarchical structure of household finance that leads households to
demand credit only in the extreme case in which internal resources are
not enough to finance desired consumption;
• An articulated credit market with collateralised consumption loans
and mortgages;
• A simple housing market with price dynamics that allow for equity
extraction behaviour by households.
Our model features two main categories of agents, namely households
(h = 1, ..., H) and banks (b = 1, ..., B). It also includes an extremely simpli-
fied government and a central bank. Agents are heterogeneous, they have
bounded rationality and follow behavioural rules based on adaptive expec-
tations.
The sequence of events in each period t is as follows:
1. GDP at time t   1 is distributed to households at the beginning of
period t, based on exogenously set income shares. The government
provides a subsidy to all households in the bottom 90% of the dis-
tribution, whose income is lower than a given threshold. The central
bank endogenously sets the policy interest rate, targeting the change
in GDP at time t   1 with respect to the mean of the previous three
periods.
2One can imagine that the firm is able to produce goods based on actual orders, so that
the goods market is always in equilibrium. This strong assumption allows us to simplify
a consistent part of the model as it does not represent the focus of our paper.
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2. The pay back phase begins. Each household assesses whether she is
able to pay back her debt by using her income and liquid wealth.
Households that are not able to do so will have to sell their house and
use the resulting liquidity to pay back their outstanding debt. For
convenience, such households are labelled as “bankrupt”. Banks use
earned interests to increase the value of their net worth.
3. All households set their desired consumption based on adaptive and
imitative behaviour and adjust their propensity to consume out of in-
come and wealth accordingly. Households whose desired consumption
is higher than the available internal resources have a positive consump-
tion gap: they can apply for a consumption loan, provided that they
own a house and have previously paid back their debt.
4. The credit market for consumption loans opens. Banks set their total
available credit supply as a multiple of their equity and rank house-
holds based on their Total Debt Service Ratio3 (TDS). Since houses
serve as collateral, the amount of credit households can get depends on
house prices. Households in the credit market for consumption loans
can apply to one bank only in each period. After the market closes,
households who get a lower amount of credit than asked, will not fill
their consumption gap: credit rationing takes place.
5. The housing market opens. All households update their price; those
who do not own a house are potential buyers. Supply of houses comes
from all the households who are forced to sell their house to pay back
their debt plus a random set of homeowners selected in each period.
Sellers set their desired price equal to the value of their house, whereas
buyers generally set their prices as a multiple of their liquid wealth.
Buyers are sorted randomly, whereas sellers are sorted in ascending
order based on their selling price, so that each buyer tries to buy from
the seller asking for the lowest price. Households who have enough
liquid wealth can buy a house directly. Those who have a deal with
a seller but lack the internal resources to pay for the entire amount,
enter the credit market for mortgages.
6. The credit market for mortgages opens. Individual demand for mort-
gages depends on the di↵erence between the selling price and the liquid
wealth of the buyer. Individual mortgage supply is based on the value
of the house to be provided as collateral. Again, banks rank households
based on their TDS. After the mortgage market closes, households who
get the needed amount of credit get back to the seller to close the deal
3Total Debt Service Ratio (TDS) is defined as the ratio between household repay-
ment schedule (the sum of consumption loan and mortgage principal plus interests) and
household income.
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and buy the house. Credit-rationed households, instead, will drop the
deal and search for another house in the following period. The housing
market closes and existing homeowners update the value of their real
wealth based on the average market price.
7. If bankrupt households have managed to sell their house, they use the
resulting liquidity to pay back their outstanding debt. Due to changes
in house prices, each household’s liquidity may be lower than the value
of her outstanding debt: the bank will record a non performing loan
and the resulting bad debt will slow down the accumulation of its net
worth.
We now provide a detailed description of all the algorithms and rules of
behaviour introduced in each section of the model.
3.1 Expenditure Cascades and Desired Consumption
At the beginning of each period t, households are divided in two income
groups: the top 10% and the bottom 90%. Each of these is provided with
a macro income share, sharey, which identifies the amount of GDPt 1 that
the two groups receive. Each household is also assigned an exogenous and
constant individual income share, shareh, such that
P
shareh = 1 within
the group of reference. Therefore, household income is defined as Yt,h =
GDPt 1 · sharey · shareh.
Our model features a key mechanism in order to explain the reason why
American households did not react to falling incomes and increased inequal-
ity by higher precautionary savings, like in Germany, but by borrowing more
(Van Treeck, 2012). In particular, the specification of desired consumption
in our model follows the expenditure cascades hypothesis introduced by
Frank et al. (2014) (equation 1)4.
Cdt,h = k (1  a)(Yt,h +Mt 1,h) + aCt 1,j (1)
Hence, h’s desired consumption is a function of her income, Yt,h, and
liquid wealth, Mt 1,h, as well as j’s actual consumption in the previous
period, where j is the household who ranks just above h in the income scale,
so that j = h + 1. Put it simply, h tries to replicate j’s consumption in
the past based on k, which is “a parameter unrelated to permanent income
level or rank” (Frank et al., 2014) and a sensitivity parameter a, such that
0  a  1: when a = 1, h fully mimics j’s consumption; whereas when
4The inclusion of liquid wealth in the equation for desired consumption follows Russo
et al. (2015)
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a = 0, h does not consider j’s consumption.5
Given the value of desired consumption, each household has to assess
whether her internal financial resources are enough to pay for it. Such pro-
cess is based on a hierarchical structure of household financing behaviour.
That is, households finance their desired consumption by using, in hierar-
chical order, their income, liquid wealth and, eventually, consumption loans.
A detailed description of this process is reported in Appendix A.
3.2 Credit Market for Consumption Loans
Demand for consumption loans, Ldt,h, is defined as the di↵erence between
desired consumption and the sum of income and liquid wealth:
Ldt,h = C
d
t,h   (Yt,h +Mt 1,h) (2)
Note that loans are collateralised by houses so that only homeowners
can enter the credit market.
Following Delli Gatti et al. (2011), the maximum allowable credit supply
by bank b is defined as a fraction 1v of its equity Et,b, where v can be
interpreted as a capital requirement coe cient. That is:
LSt,b =
Et,b
v
(3)
Each bank ranks households in ascending order based on their TDS,
and supplies credit until LSt,b = 0. Therefore, applicants with zero TDS
are given priority and they are selected in random order. The formulation
of credit supply follows the literature on collateral constraints spawned by
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and recalled by more recent works in the DSGE
literature (e.g. Justiniano et al., 2013).
Bank b o↵ers individual single-period debt contracts, LSHt,b,h, whose
amount is based on the loan to value ratio,  , the market value of h’s real
wealth, RWt,h6, the balance owed on the existing mortgage, ZRt,h, and the
interest rate on consumption loans, rLt,b,h:
LSHt,b,h =
 RWt,h   ZRt,h
1 + rLt,b,h
(4)
We assume the loan to value ratio to be the same for all banks. Following
Russo et al. (2015), the interest rate on consumption loans is based on three
elements:
5Our consumption mechanism implicitly assumes that (1) all households know how
income is distributed so that each h can select the corresponding j; (2) households can
observe j’s consumption in the previous period.
6Real wealth is defined formally in section 3.3.
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rLt,b,h = rt + crb,t + rt,h (5)
rt is the policy rate set by the central bank at the beginning of each
period (see subsection 3.6), crt,b is a bank specific component that reflects
the sensitivity (measured by ⇢) of each bank to its own leverage, LBt,b.
Hence, crt,b = ⇢LBt,b, where bank leverage is the ratio between the total
amount of loans and mortgages supplied by bank b and its equity. Finally,
rt,h is a household specific component equal to µTDSt,h, where µ is banks’
sensitivity to household total debt service ratio. We also assume ⇢ and µ to
be the same for all banks.
Note that our setting of the credit market for consumption loans implies
banks have an information set that includes the amount of outstanding debt
of each borrower. Hence, by looking at each borrower’s TDS, the bank is
able to apply an interest rate that takes into account the financial soundness
of each borrower.
Each household searches for the bank applying the lowest interest rate.7
Once found, household h accepts the o↵er, enters the credit network of
bank b and gets LOANt,h = Ldt,h if LSHt,b,h   Ldt,h or LOANt,h = LSHt,b,h
otherwise. The debt contract corresponds to a repayment schedule defined
as RSLt,h = LOANt,h(1 + r
L
t,b,h), to be paid back entirely in the following
period.
The design of the credit market for consumption loans allows the model
to capture the home-equity based borrowing mechanism as described by
Mian and Sufi (2009). Indeed, when house prices increase, both existing and
new homeowners can exploit the higher value of their real wealth to access
credit market and borrow against their equity. The newly accumulated debt
is then used to finance consumption expenditure.
3.3 Housing and Mortgage Market
The housing market features a fixed stock, H, of houses, which is distributed
to a constant number of households randomly selected at the beginning of
period t = 1.8 Each homeowner owns one house only and does not want
to increase her stock. In other words, existing homeowners can enter the
housing market on the supply side only: they never demand additional
houses. As a result, the number (but not the identity) of homeowners, is
fixed over time.
In period t = 1, each homeowner is also assigned a house price, PHt,h
drawn from a uniform distribution. Therefore, household real wealth, RWt,h,
7If two or more banks set the same interest rate, households select one randomly.
8We do not include construction firms as we are not interested in quantity dynamics,
but exclusively on housing price dynamics.
42
is defined as RWt,h = PHt,hHt,h, where Ht,h is h’s housing unit and it is equal
to 1 for all households.
In every period, each homeowner updates the value of her house, by
assessing whether the market is experiencing excess supply or excess demand
using the number of unsold houses as a proxy. In particular, as shown in
conditions 6 and 7, homeowners set the new value of their house at time t
based on their price in the previous period (PHt 1,h) and a markdown ( ⇠t),
if the number of unsold houses at the beginning of t is higher than at the
beginning of t 1, or a markup (+⇠t) otherwise. The price remains the same
if the number of unsold houses does not change.
PHt,h =
8><>:
PHt 1,h(1  ⇠t) if unsoldt   unsoldt 1 > 0 (6)
PHt 1,h(1 + ⇠t) if unsoldt   unsoldt 1 < 0 (7)
PHt 1,h if unsoldt   unsoldt 1 = 0 (8)
The magnitude of the change in the number of unsold houses reflects into
the mark-up/down (9), so that the higher the di↵erence between unsoldt and
unsoldt 1, the higher ⇠t.
⇠t = ⇠min +
(⇠max   ⇠min)
1 + 1|Xt|
where Xt =
unsoldt   unsoldt 1
unsoldt 1
(9)
⇠max and ⇠min in equation 9 are parameters set in the initialisation phase,
which are meant to limit the range of oscillation of the mark-up/down.
In every period, a number of randomly selected homeowners enters the
housing market on the supply side. Similar to Erlingsson et al. (2013), we
include random sellers in order to “address the trading activities driven not
by speculative reasons but by di↵erent reasons, like family needs, migration”,
and so on.9 In addition, all bankrupt households have to join the supply side
of the market: since they have failed to meet their obligations with banks,
they have to sell their house in order to get the liquidity to pay back their
outstanding debt.
When entering the market, sellers set their selling price equal to their
updated price at the beginning of each period, that is PSt,h = PHt,h.
All households who do not own a house enter the housing market placing
themselves on the demand side.10 All buyers set a desired price, PBt,h, as
a multiple ✓ > 0 of their liquid wealth (condition 10). If they have no
9This random set in each period t cannot include homeowners who use their house as
a collateral for consumption loan in the same period. In addition, we also rule out the
possibility of selecting homeowners who have bought the house in the previous ”rests”
periods, where ”rests” is a parameter set in the initialisation phase of the model.
10The set of buyers does not include all households who have sold a house in the previous
”restb” periods, where ”restb” is a parameter set in the initialisation phase of the model.
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liquid wealth, they will apply a mark-up to the average market price in the
previous period (condition 11).
PBt,h =
(
✓Mt 1,h if Mt 1,h > 0 (10)
PHt 1(1 + ⇠t,h) if Mt 1,h = 0 (11)
Transactions among households in the housing market are based on a
search and matching mechanism: the main rule for buyers is to look for a
seller such that PSt,h  PBt,h. All sellers are sorted in ascending order
based on the selling price, whereas buyers are sorted randomly. The first
buyer to enter the search and matching process assesses whether her price
is higher than that of the first seller. If so, they set a deal; otherwise the
buyer leaves the market and tries to buy a house in the following period.
The second buyer steps in and searches for an available seller (i.e. a seller
who does not have a deal with a buyer). The process keeps running until
all buyers have had the chance to search for a seller.
When a deal is set up, the agreed price of the transaction is the price set
by the seller. Buyers who have enough liquid wealth are allowed to buy the
house directly: the seller transfers her real wealth to the buyer, who is now
a new homeowner. In exchange, the seller gets an amount of liquidity equal
to the selling price, so that Liqt,h = PSt,h. This will increase her liquid
wealth.
Buyers who do not have enough liquid wealth to buy a house, enter the
mortgage market. Demand for mortgages, Zdt,h, is equal to the selling price
net of the downpayment, that is the whole amount of available (if any) liquid
wealth:
Zdt,h = PSt,h  Mt 1,h (12)
By design, also households with no liquid wealth can apply for a mort-
gage. In other words, a downpayment is not necessary. Even though this
might sound as an extreme assumption, in the years before the recent fi-
nancial crisis “buyers could be given loans exceeding 80% of home price; or
they could be given two loans, one for 80% of purchase price - making the
loan potentially sellable to FNMA - and another (the down payment) for
the other 20%” (Dimsky, 2010).
Bank behaviour in the credit market for mortgages follows the same rules
as in the credit market for consumption loans: they rank households in as-
cending order based on their TDS and supply mortgages until LSt,b = 0.
Again, applicants with zero TDS are given priority. We assume all banks
issue standard “plain-vanilla” mortgage contracts, ZSHt,b,h, with fixed in-
terest rates, the duration being Tz.
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ZSHt,b,h =
 RWt,h
1 + rzt,b,h
(13)
Also in the mortgage market, the definition of the interest rate, rzt,b,h, is
as follows:
rzt,b,h = rt + crb,t + rt,h (14)
Each household searches for the banks whose individual supply is higher
than her demand. Then, within the subset of selected banks, h selects the
bank o↵ering the lowest interest rate as shown in condition 15.11
8 b s.t. ZSHt,b,h   Zdt,h , find min(rzt,b,h) (15)
If h finds a bank b satisfying condition 15, she accepts the o↵er of that
bank, joins its credit network and gets a mortgage equal to Zt,h = ZSHt,b,h:
from the following period until t+Tz, h will have a constant periodic payment
which is based on the standardised calculations in the U.S. (as defined by
Kohn, 1990):
ZPt,h = Zt,h
rzt,b,h (1 + r
z
t,b,h)
Tz
(1 + rzt,b,h)  1
(16)
All households who do not find any bank willing to supply more than
what they demand, leave the market without getting any mortgage. They
drop the deal with the corresponding seller and search for a house and,
eventually, a mortgage in the following period.
On the contrary, all the households who successfully found a mortgage
get back to the corresponding seller to proceed with the transfer of real
wealth. The buyer becomes the owner of the house, whereas the seller gets
the corresponding liquidity equal to the selling price, thus increasing her
liquid wealth.
Notice that the mechanisms included in the housing market allow to cap-
ture the impact that housing price dynamics have on existing homeowners
and their home equity based borrowing behaviour. This is because the value
of their equity reflects the changes in the number of unsold houses via house
prices.
After mortgage and housing market close, each bank has a credit network
made of all the households to which it has supplied consumption loans and
11Also in the mortgage market, if two or more banks set the same interest rate, each
household selects one randomly.
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mortgages. All banks update the value of their assets, ABt,b, and their
leverage ratio, that is LBt,b = ABt,b/Et,b.
All borrowers update their debt and total debt service ratio as follows:
Debtt,h = Debtt 1,h + LOANt,h + Zt,h (17)
TDSt,h =
ZPt,h +RSLt 1,h
Yt,h
(18)
3.4 Pay Back Phase
As already pointed out, the pay back phase (PBP) starts at the beginning of
each period t. In the PBP, some borrowers have to pay the repayment sched-
ule of the consumption loan obtained in the previous period; others have to
fulfill the recurring mortgage payment. Finally, a number of households has
to do both. Each household is able to meet her obligations entirely if and
only if ZPt,h +RSLt 1,h  Yt,h +Mt 1,h. If this condition is satisfied, house-
hold h pays ZPt,h and RSLt 1,h in sequence, thus experiencing a reduction
of her debt and the balance owed on the existing mortgage. Consequently,
also her total debt service ratio decreases. In addition, each bank b earns
profits equal to the sum of the interest payment of all the household in its
credit network, CN , that is:
INTt,b =
X
h2CN
(rLt,b,hLOANt 1,h + int
Z
t,h) (19)
Households who fail to meet their obligations, instead, try to pay back
their outstanding debt only after selling their house. If they do not manage
to sell it in period t, they will try to do so in any other following period.
When bankrupt households sell their house, they assess whether the re-
sulting liquidity, Liqt,h, is higher than the entire repayment schedule: ifPTz
ii=t⇤ ZPii,h + RS
L
t⇤,h  Liqt,h, their debt goes down to zero and they are
not labelled as bankrupt anymore as they pay back both the entire principal
and interests.12 Moreover, they will keep the excess liquidity thus increas-
ing their liquid wealth. On the contrary, if
PTz
ii=t⇤ ZPii,h + RS
L
t⇤,h > Liqt,h,
household h pays a lower amount than due. In this case, the non-performing
loan results in bad debt on banks’ balance sheets. The computation of bad
debt is based on the composition of household debt. Indeed, if h belongs to
12Notice that t⇤ identifies the default period, namely the period at which household h
failed to meet her obligation
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the credit network of two banks at the same time13, she splits the liquidity
in two parts (equations 20 and 21): a part of it,  Lt,h, will go to the bank
that supplied the consumption loan, the remaining part,  Zt,h, being paid to
the bank that issued the mortgage.
 Lt,h =
RSLt⇤,hPTz
ii=t⇤ ZPii,h +RS
L
t⇤,h
(20)
 Zt,h =
ZPt⇤,hPTz
ii=t⇤ ZPii,h +RS
L
t⇤,h
(21)
Hence, the amount of bad debt due to h’s default is as follows:
bdt,h,b =
8>><>>:
RSLt⇤,h    Lt,hLiqt,h (22)
TzX
ii=t⇤
ZPii,h    Zt,hLiqt,h (23)
As shown in equation 24, the overall amount of bad debt, BDt,b, for
each bank b is calculated as the sum of the entire bad debt coming from the
bankrupt households who belong to its credit network.
BDt,b =
X
h2HB
bdt,h,b (24)
HB ⇢ CN identifies the subset of all the bankrupt households in the
credit network of bank b.
After the pay back phase, each bank updates its equity based on the
following accumulation process:
Et,b = Et 1,b + INTt,b  BDt,b (25)
Notice that, similar to Delli Gatti et al. (2010), the bankruptcy of a
household creates a negative externality since the bad debt recorded on the
bank’s balance sheet results in a reduction of banks’ equity and, therefore,
a higher bank leverage which implies a higher interest rate and a reduction
in the overall credit supply.
13Households can join two credit networks when they get a consumption loan from a
bank and a mortgage from another one. Notice that since households cannot apply for
more than one consumption loan and one mortgage, they cannot belong to more than two
credit networks.
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In addition, it may be the case that bad debt is high enough that Et,b
is lower than zero, the bank has negative net worth and goes bankrupt. In
this case, following Delli Gatti et al. (2011), we assume that whenever a
bank records negative equity, “the government bails the bank out, replacing
it with a random copy of surviving banks”.
3.5 Goods Market, Consumption and Saving
After the housing and mortgage markets close, the goods market opens.
We assume the representative firm always supplies the required amount of
goods, so that no rationing takes place in the goods market.
All households make their consumption and saving decisions based on
the level of desired consumption. Households who have enough internal
resources, as well as those who managed to access the credit market and
get a consumption loan, can close the gap between desired consumption
and actual consumption expenditure, so that Ct,h = Cdt,h, where Ct,h ⌘
↵t,hYt,h +  t,hMt 1,h + Lt,h.
All households save a portion 1 ↵t,h of income that is converted into a
zero interest rate deposit, Dt,h = (1  ↵t,h)Yt,h.
Household liquid wealth therefore becomes:
Mt,h =Mt 1,h +Dt,h + Liqt,h (26)
Finally, each household has an overall amount of wealth equal to:
At,h =Mt,h +RWt,h   ZRt,h (27)
3.6 Policy Authorities
In our model the government serves the only purpose of smoothing income
disparities by redistributing income from the top to the bottom.
To do so, we assume the government does deficit spending: it collects
taxes on income based on the same tax rate for all households and spends
a constant exceeding percentage of its earnings from taxes.
Government spending is entirely distributed to households at the bottom
90% of the distribution in the form government subsidies that increase their
individual income. Subsidies are the same for all households. However,
since the amount of taxes collected in each period t depends on income in
the previous period (i.e. GDPt 1), the amount of each subsidy depends on
the performance of the economy.
On the other hand, the central bank has a countercyclical policy: at the
beginning of each period it increases the policy rate if GDP at time t   1
is lower than the mean of GDP in previous three periods (GDPt 2,t 4).
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However, it also looks at the one-to-one change in GDP between t   1 and
t  2. That is:
rt =
(
rt 1 · (1  ⌧t) if GDPt 1  GDPt 2,t 4 and GDPt 1  GDPt 2
rt 1 · (1 + ⌧t) if GDPt 1 > GDPt 2,t 4 and GDPt 1   GDPt 2
(28)
Similar to house prices, ⌧t is a mark-up/down that depends on the mag-
nitude of the change in the key variable, that is GDP in this case (Equation
29).
⌧t = ⌘min +
(⌘max   ⌘min)
1 + 1|Qt|
where Qt =
GDPt 1  GDPt 2,t 4
GDPt 2,t 4
(29)
⌘min and ⌘max are set in the initialisation phase and are meant to limit
the degree of oscillation of ⌧t.
4 Model Results
We use our model to simulate two scenarios: a baseline scenario (BA) in
which income shares at the beginning of each period t remain constant over
time and a rising inequality scenario (RI) in which we shock income shares
after a number of periods in order to simulate rising inequality. Model results
are obtained by means of Monte Carlo (MC) analysis: given a parameter
vector, we run 30 simulations for each of the two scenarios, selecting a
di↵erent random seed at each run, similar to Delli Gatti et al. (2011) and
Russo et al. (2015). Our parameter vector is set up mostly based on the
literature as well as the need to rule out explosive dynamics and unrealistic
patterns, similar to Delli Gatti et al. (2011), so that “no attempt has been
made at this stage to calibrate the model for instance, by means of genetic
algorithms in order to force the output of simulation to replicate some
pre-selected empirical regularities”. In addition, we also perform univariate
sensitivity analysis by changing the values of some key parameters so as to
asses the change in the outcome of simulations.
In order to run simulations we calibrate model parameters as shown in
Table 1.
The choice of assigning a house to 260 randomly selected households
follows Mian and Sufi (2009) who point out that “65% of U.S. households
already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices
beginning in the late 1990s”. The initial loan-to-value ratio for all banks
is equal to 0.8 and it is in line with the data for 1990 reported in Duca
et al. (2011) and retrieved from the American Housing Survey. v, which, as
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Parameter Value
T Number of periods 2000
H Number of households 400
B Number of banks 20
HO Number of homeowners 260
a Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption 0.5
k Consumption parameter independent of income or rank 0.8
v Capital requirement coe cient 0.08
µ Bank sensitivity to TDS 0.005
⇢ Bank sensitivity to own leverage 0.005
  Loan to value ratio 0.8
✓ Multiple of liquid wealth 100
⇠min Minimum mark-up/down for house prices 0.01
⇠max Maximum mark-up/down for house prices 0.1
⌘min Minimum mark-up/down for the policy interest rate 0.01
⌘max Maximum mark-up/down for the policy interest rate 0.05
Tz Duration of mortgages 120
rests Number of “freezing” periods for sellers 16
restb Number of “freezing” periods for buyers 4
Table 1: Model calibration
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already pointed out, can be interpreted as a capital requirement coe cient
is set to 0.08, following the standard value in the literature (see, for example,
Benes et al., 2014). Finally, the values of a and k are taken from the original
work on expenditure cascades by Frank et al. (2014).
4.1 Monte Carlo Analysis: Baseline Scenario vs. Rising In-
equality
Starting from our parameter vector, we perform our MC simulations: for
each scenario, we compute the cross-simulation mean of the key variables.
For example, we calculate GDP at each time t as the average of GDP across
the 30 MC simulations for each of the two scenarios.
In all simulations we drop the first 1100 periods in order to get rid
of transients: graphs only show the last 900 periods for the purpose of
simplicity.14 In addition, we represent all data generated by our model as
simple moving averages in order to smooth out the cyclical fluctuations of
the key time series.15
In each scenario, the key time series show the same pattern across all
MC simulations: cross-section time series in particular (e.g. total wealth
share, consumption share, default rate, successful mortgage applicants) are
all stationary at least in the last 500 periods in BA.
In both BA and RI, the model starts with unequal income shares for
the top 10% and bottom 90%, with values respectively equal to 31.51% and
68.49%. These are retrieved from the World Top Income Database (Fa-
cundo et al., 2014) with reference to the United States for the year 1975.
In RI we simulate a shock in the income shares that become equal 62.57%
for the bottom 90%, 37.43% for the top 10% from period 100 until the end.16
Model results suggest our ABM fits the stylised facts described in section
2 of this paper. GDP, household debt and house prices follow the same
pattern and are strictly correlated as shown in Figure 1, which collects the
combined plots of such key time series in the two scenarios, together with
their correlation values (see also Table 2 featuring a few key statistics for
GDP and household debt).
Endogenous business cycles emerge in BA as a result of the agents’ inter-
actions that lead to small oscillations of house prices and household debt.17
14Hence, the description of the two scenarios refers to the last 900 periods and thus
takes period 1101 as period 1.
15We choose a window size for our moving averages equal to 20.
16Such values are equal to the mean of the income shares for the groups in the period
between 1971 and 2006.
17Note that house prices have a slightly decreasing trend. This is in contrast with the
empirical evidence, particularly in the United States. Yet, this result is easily explained:
as we want to keep the model as simple as possible, existing homeowners are allowed to
enter the housing market on the supply side only, thereby resulting in a downward pressure
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Figure 1: Left column, top: GDP (black) and household debt (gray) in BA
(correlation: 0.99, significant at 5% level); bottom: household debt (gray)
and average house prices (black) in BA (correlation: 0.85, significant at 5%
level). Right column, top: GDP (black) and household debt (gray) in RI
(correlation: 0.89, significant at 5% level); bottom: household debt (gray)
and average house prices (black) in RI (correlation: 0.82, significant at 5%
level).
Figure 2: GDP in BA (gray) and RI (black).
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Figure 3: Amount of consumption loans supplied to households in each
period t in BA (gray) and RI (black).
Scenario
Average growth
rate (%)
Mean Variance
Standard
Deviation
GDP - BA 0.12 2478605.62 2718604888.14 52140.24
GDP - RI 0.2 2759851.12 13561870075.59 116455.44
Household Debt - BA 0.29 1974999.09 1997990747.62 44698.89
Household Debt - RI 0.9 1991219.39 3546517787.83 59552.65
Table 2: Key statistics for crosse section GDP and household debt in the
two scenarios.
However, when income shares change and inequality rises, GDP increases
substantially, as shown in Figure 2. The inequality shock has various con-
sequences.
First, Figure 3 compares the amount of consumption loans households
actually get in each period in the two scenarios. Clearly, with higher in-
equality, households’ demand for consumption loans increases as income at
the bottom of the distribution is stagnating and households need external
resources to finance their desired consumption. However, also note that
house prices do not change significantly for a number of periods as shown
in Figure 4. Hence how can households increase their debt?
The answer to this question comes by looking at the behaviour of house-
holds at the top of the distribution: they exploit the newly accumulated
amount of income to buy more houses whereas households in the bottom
90% lower the number of houses being bought. Indeed, as shown in Figure
on house prices.
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Figure 4: Average house price in BA (gray) and RI (black).
5, the real wealth of the top 10% rises right after the shock.
This results in a greater number of direct buys and, consequently, in a
reduction of mortgages (Figure 6).
The impact on the banking sector is relevant: lower mortgages imply
lower bad debt and therefore higher net worth. Hence, banks increase the
maximum allowable credit supply: a greater number of households is now
able to get the desired amount of consumption loans. This is the reason why,
right after the shock, the overall amount of consumption loans increases even
though house prices remain roughly stable for a while. We might call this a
“supply e↵ect”: more households can borrow because of greater availability
of credit, not because of changes in house prices. The increased amount of
debt for consumption loans results immediately in higher household spend-
ing thus pushing GDP upwards, as seen in Figure 2.
After a number of periods, house prices increase smoothly. Indeed, as
these rise, the value of mortgages being issued increase as well: people at
the bottom of the distribution borrow to buy a house as well. Higher house
prices also result in greater consumption loans. The overall consequence is
booming household debt (Figure 7). This sustains consumption and GDP for
a while, thereby giving the false impression that the economy is performing
well.
Nonetheless, when households start defaulting on their obligations, a dra-
matically large amount of bad debt is accumulated by the banking system
that reacts by cutting credit supply and increasing interest rates. Given the
existence of interconnected credit networks among households and banks,
the consequence of a growing number of non-performing loans is a credit
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Figure 5: Share of real wealth held by the top 10% in BA (gray) and RI
(black).
Figure 6: Amount of mortgages in BA (gray) and RI (black).
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Figure 7: Household debt in BA (gray) and RI (black).
crunch that a↵ects future borrowers and their ability to finance desired con-
sumption. Therefore, the crisis emerges as a balance sheet recession: house-
holds fail to meet their debt obligations and banks record a substantial value
of bad debt. Figure 8 shows this is the case in RI: as households take on
more debt, both in the form of consumption loans and mortgages, they lack
the internal resources to pay it back due to rising income inequality and
bad debt rises. Note that the correlation between GDP and bad debt of the
banking sector is 0.89, which are statistically significant at 5% level: this
suggests that the expansion of the economy goes together with the amount
of non-performing loans.
Due to the emerging credit crunch, households are forced to consume
less than desired, thus leading to falling actual consumption and GDP. After
entering a recession, household debt and bad debt decline as well: this is
mostly due to lower mortgages. In fact, the amount of consumption loans
remains roughly stable even though this is not enough to keep consumption
up to its previous levels. The reason is that the number of households who is
able to get the desired amount of consumption loans drops: in other words,
less people are getting more loans but a wider number of households is forced
to cut their consumption as a consequence of bankruptcy.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We now show the results of our sensitivity analysis with the aim of show-
ing how model output changes when we explore the parameter space. In
particular, following Delli Gatti et al. (2011), we perform univariate sen-
sitivity analysis for the baseline scenario, “according to which the model
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Figure 8: Bad debt for the banking sector in AB (gray) and RI (black).
outcomes are analyzed with respect to the variation of one parameter at
a time, whereas all the other parameters of the system remain constant”.
We act on five di↵erent parameters, namely a, k, µ, ⇢ and ✓ which are the
sensitivity parameters of our model. We find that for three of these param-
eters, that is a, k and ⇢, model results change in line with our intuitions.
On the contrary, changes in µ and ✓ do not seem to a↵ect the dynamics of
our artificial economy in any relevant manner.
Let us summarise our main findings.
Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption: a. We run 30
MC simulations for the baseline scenario, for 4 di↵erent values of a: 0.2,
0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. Results show that the lower the value of a, the higher the
(stationary) trend along which GDP oscillates. In particular, lower levels of
a imply a less imitative behaviour by households: since desired consumption
is set mostly based on internal resources, a larger number of households is
able to finance it without accessing credit markets for consumption loans.
Indeed, the lower a, the lower the amount of consumption loans. This also
results in smaller debt-to-GDP ratios and total debt service by households.
Consequently, less households default on their obligations and banks record
a fewer number of non-performing loans.
Consumption parameter: k. We run 30 MC simulations for the
baseline scenario, for 3 di↵erent values of k: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6. Remember that
in all these experiments, a is equal to its original value of 0.5. Changing
the value of k does not imply a di↵erent sensitivity to j’s consumption
for household h. Rather, it means each household is targeting a di↵erent
amount of internal resources to set her desired consumption. Results suggest
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that lower values of k go along together with business cycles along lower
trends: GDP and consumption loans have smaller values. With less GDP
to be distributed, households have lower internal resources to pay back their
debt: non-performing loans and bad debt have higher values, thus resulting
in higher debt-to-GDP ratios.
Bank sensitivity to TDS: µ. In this experiment we run 30 MC simu-
lations for the baseline scenario, for 3 di↵erent values of µ: 0.001, 0.01, 0.05.
In this case we find that modifications in banks’ sensitivity to households’
total debt service ratios do not imply any significant change in the model
results and the overall dynamics of the economy. Results are in line with
those reported for the baseline scenario using the parameter vector described
above.
Bank sensitivity to own leverage: ⇢. In this experiment we run 30
MC simulations for the baseline scenario, for 3 di↵erent values of ⇢: 0.001,
0.01, 0.05. When banks are more sensitive to their own leverage, interest
rates are higher. This results in higher total debt service ratio and a rise
in the number of defaults and the value of bad debt. On the other hand,
households are less willing to take on more debt so that household debt falls
as well as debt-to-GDP ratios.
Multiple of liquid wealth: ✓. In this experiment we run 30 MC
simulations for the baseline scenario, for 4 di↵erent values of ✓: 50, 80, 120,
150. We find that modifications in the value of ✓ do not result in significant
changes in model outcome: all the key time series follow the same pattern
as in our baseline, thus suggesting that ✓ is not a key parameter in a↵ecting
output and model dynamics.
5 Concluding Remarks
By means of an agent-based model we create an artificial economy with het-
erogenous agents whose interactions result in mutual feedbacks and emerg-
ing macroeconomic dynamics resembling the ones that took place before and
during the recent financial crisis in the United States. By including some
key elements regarding household consumption behaviour and the function-
ing of credit and housing markets, the data generating process built in our
model captures the impact of increasing inequality on household debt and
the overall stability of the economy.
On the one hand, growing income disparities force low and middle income
households to enter credit markets so as to find the external resources that
are needed to satisfy consumption needs. This captures the pressure of
inequality on the lower segments of society. On the other hand, higher house
prices, fueled by mortgage credit and the accumulation of wealth at the top
of the distribution, allow for relaxed collateral constraints thus impacting
households’ ability to borrow.
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The combination of these elements gives rise to an extended borrow-
ing binge, as described by Fazzari and Cynamon (2013). This undermines
the stability of the system: when household debt skyrockets, a growing
number of households default on their obligations. Non-performing loans
a↵ect banks’ balance sheets and their willingness to lend. Hence, the credit
bubble created by higher inequality and household debt collapses and the
structural vulnerability of the economy emerges. Therefore, as highlighted
by Galbraith (2012), the link between radical inequality and financial cri-
sis runs precisely through private debt. However, “the problem with the
trick of generating prosperity through inequality is simply that it cannot be
continually repeated” (Galbraith, 2012).
From a policy perspective, our results seem to go in the direction of a
redistributive policy in favour of the poorer segments of society, as a less
unequal society seems to benefit from smoother and more stable oscillations
of GDP, whereas a more unequal society su↵ers from dramatic booms and
busts for the reasons explained above. In other words, our findings support
the work carried out at the International Monetary Fund by Ostry et al.
(2014) who find that lower inequality has a positive impact of growth both
in terms of speed and stability.
Even though the current setting of our model proves useful in studying
the dynamics described above, further improvements could be made in order
to assess a broader set of issues. For example, similar to Delli Gatti et al.
(2011, 2010), we could include heterogenous firms that can hire and fire
workers, or access credit markets, based on their financial conditions. This
would allow us to include bargain processes in wage setting mechanisms and
to study unemployment dynamics in periods of expansion and recession.
Another possible extension is the inclusion of construction firms in the
housing market so as to drop the assumption of a fixed stock of houses
and number of homeowners. This might change house price dynamics and
investment mechanisms by richer households.
Finally, another interesting aspect deals with the international dimension
of the crisis. Indeed, by extending our model to a multi-country setting we
could capture the dynamics of business cycles and external imbalances in
the presence of rising income disparities. As a matter of fact, the higher
inequality results in di↵erent economic patterns across countries: on the one
hand, households in debt-led economies increase consumption by borrowing,
thus leading to a borrowing binge or capital inflows; on the other hand,
households in export-led countries lower their consumption thereby leading
to excessive savings and depressed growth.
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A Appendix - Hierarchical Structure of House-
hold Finance
Figure 9: Hierarchical structure of household finance.
The functioning of the hierarchical structure of household finance is
shown in Figure 9.
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In general, households finance their desired consumption by using a por-
tion 0 < ↵t,h  1 of their income, a portion 0   t,h  1 of liquid wealth
and, eventually, consumption loans, Lt,h. More specifically, h adjusts her
propensity to consume out of income so that ↵t,h = Cdt,h/Yt,h. If C
d
t,h  Yt,h,
then ↵t,h  1 and h is able to finance her desired consumption by us-
ing her income only: no wealth wears away and in this case  t,h = 0 and
Lt,h = 0. On the contrary, if Cdt,h > Yt,h, then ↵t,h > 1 thus violating its do-
main. As such, we impose ↵t,h = 1, so that h consumes her income entirely.
Yet, this is not enough to finance desired consumption and consequently h
needs to use her liquid wealth as well:  t,h becomes positive and equal to
(Cdt,h Yt,h)/Mt,h, provided that h has a positive amount of liquid wealth18.
If (Cdt,h   Yt,h) Mt,h,  t,h  1 and h has enough internal resources to pay
for her desired consumption. If (Cdt,h Yt,h) > Mt,h, then  t,h is greater than
one, thereby violating its domain. In this case we impose  t,h = 1: h also
consumes her liquid wealth entirely but has to apply for a consumption loan
in order to close the gap between her desired consumption and the resources
needed to finance it.
18It may be the case that h has no liquid wealth: if she is a homeowner, then she can
enter the credit market directly to ask for a consumption loan. If h does not own a house,
she will be forced to consume less than her desired consumption.
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Abstract
By means of a macroeconomic model with an agent-based house-
hold sector and a stock-flow consistent structure, we analyse the im-
pact of rising income inequality on the likelihood of a crisis for di↵er-
ent institutional settings. In particular, we study how economic crises
emerge in the presence of di↵erent credit conditions and policy reac-
tions to rising income disparities. Our simulations show the relevance
of the degree of financialisation of an economy. In fact, when inequal-
ity grows, a Scylla and Charybdis kind of dilemma seems to arise: on
the one hand, low credit availability implies a drop in aggregate de-
mand and output; on the other hand, relaxed credit constraints and a
higher willingness to lend result in greater financial instability and a
debt-driven boom and bust cycle. We also point out that policy reac-
tions play a key role: a real structural reform that tackles inequality,
by means of a more progressive tax system, actually compensates for
the rise in income disparities thereby stabilising the economy. Results
also show that this is a better solution compared to a stronger fiscal
policy reaction, which, instead, only leads to a larger duration of the
boom and bust cycle.
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1 Introduction: Inequality, Institutions and Fi-
nancialisation
It is widely established that inequality increased substantially, both in de-
veloped and in emerging economies, starting from the late 1970s (Atkinson
et al., 2011; IMF, 2007; Milanovic, 2010; OECD, 2008; Piketty and Saez,
2013). In particular, in Europe and in the United States those who have
lost ground belong to the middle class, while in other areas of the world,
such as China, the rise of inequality has hit the very poor. Nonetheless, in
all cases the redistribution has benefited mainly the rich and the very rich
(the top one percent of the population, see Figure 1), giving birth to what
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) define as the “Superstar Economy”.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Top 10%
Top 5%
Top 1%
Unweighted average of the following countries: SP,DK,NZ,FR,SW,NL,NZ,UK,IR,SG,SD,IT,JP,US 
 
Source: Author's Calculation on data from the  Piketty-Saez Top Incomes Database 
Figure 1: Average Change in Income Shares for Di↵erent Percentiles - 1980-
2007.
Even though widening income inequality seems to be a widespread phe-
nomenon (Table 1) in the recent years, cross-country di↵erences have emerged
in terms of economic performance1.
The American economy, for example, performed reasonably well with an
average annual growth rate of 3.16% between 1981 and 2007. In particu-
lar, the United States have experienced an excess of demand over domestic
production that resulted in an increasingly important trade deficit, which in
2006 peaked at almost 6% of GDP. This deficit was financed by the excess
savings that, with di↵erent causes, characterised other regions of the world
for more than a decade.
In China and in other East Asian countries, due to the lack of a proper
1Among the selected countries, France is the only one where the Gini index has de-
creased in the selected time-span.
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Country oldest latest
China 27.69 (1984) 42.06 (2010)
France 33.00 (1989) 31.69 (2005)
Germany 28.61 (1984) 31.83 (2007)
Italy 32.52 (1986) 35.52 (2010)
Spain 32.33 (1990) 35.75 (2010)
United Kingdom 36.21 (1991) 38.04 (2010)
United States 36.96 (1986) 41.12 (2010)
Table 1: Gini index in selected countries. Source: FRED
welfare state and of a reliable financial system, higher inequality yielded an
excess of precautionary savings for businesses and households.2
Following growing income disparities, continental Europe (Germany in
particular) experienced excess savings as well, even though, in our view,
they were caused by the inertia of economic policy and by low investment
rates, which depressed demand and income. As such, this part of the region
relied on export-led growth alone.
These opposite imbalances compensated each other for almost two decades,
resulting in an overall balance that the recent crisis proved to be fragile. The
reason why increased inequality has led to excess savings in some areas, while
resulting in excesses demand in others, lies in the interaction of the trend in
income distribution, common to all countries, with institutional di↵erences
- most notably, the degree of financialisation - and the policy responses that
have taken very di↵erent forms.
As a matter of fact, the development of financial markets seems to be a
key factor that explains such di↵erences among countries. As pointed out by
Kumhof et al. (2012), the increase in income inequality in the United States
and, in general, in more advanced economies, has not been tackled by means
of political interventions to support the living standards of those who su↵er
from stagnating incomes. Rather, policy authorities have temporarily alle-
viated its consequences “through access to cheap borrowing, in other words
through financial liberalization” (Kumhof et al., 2012). Krueger and Perri
(2006) argue that the rise in inequality in the United States led to a change
in the development of financial markets, which have allowed households to
better insure against fluctuations of income. Therefore, in the United States,
the reduction in income has been o↵set by private borrowing, made easier
by a less regulated financial system, but also by a widespread perception
of “end of history” which led to believe that all constraints to the unlim-
ited growth of some sectors (financial, real estate) had been permanently
2In addition, after the 1997 crisis, authorities in these countries started a policy of
reserve accumulation to deal with possible sudden stops.
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removed. Consequently, aggregate demand has remained high, even if it has
been debt-driven rather than income-driven.
Hence, as claimed by Van Treeck (2013), “in advanced economies with
highly developed financial markets, including most notably the United States
and the United Kingdom, rising inequality has led to a deterioration of na-
tional saving-investment balances, as the poor and middle classes borrowed
from the rich and from foreign lenders to finance consumption”.
However growing inequality in other regions of the world, such as China,
led to a di↵erent outcome because “financial markets are less developed and
hence do not allow the lower and middle classes to respond to lower incomes
by borrowing” (Van Treeck, 2013). The implication is a weaker domestic de-
mand and the emergence of an export-oriented growth model, where richer
creditors lend to foreign rather than domestic borrowers. Also continental
Europe has developed an export-oriented growth model, as stricter regula-
tion of financial markets and less accommodating monetary policies have
made borrowing for households and firms more di cult and expensive. Pe-
ripheral Europe also experienced a rise in top income shares in the recent
decades (Atkinson et al., 2011). However, in contrast with the rest of the
continent, these countries recorded growing level of household indebtedness
as well as current account deficits (Kumhof et al., 2012).
Some authors point out that also policies have played a role in amplify-
ing the imbalances among countries. For example, Rajan (2010) argues that
monetary authorities in the United States fostered the speculative boom by
implementing an expansionary policy in order to stimulate the economy, thus
facilitating household access to credit markets and sustaining consumption
for a while, albeit at the price of booming household debt. Rajan empha-
sises in particular the role of government failures: “the political response to
rising inequality whether carefully planned or an unpremeditated reaction
to constituent demands was to expand lending to households, especially
low-income ones”, so as to end up with rising household debt. While Rajan
may be right in pointing at excessively lax monetary policy, the role of the
central bank has only led to the amplification of a structural phenomenon,
namely widening income disparities (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011).
One might also wonder why monetary policy has been the main policy
instrument. Stiglitz (2012) suggests that political reasons matter in this
case:
High inequality is often accompanied by a demand for a smaller
government and more fiscal restraint. (...) Policies are often af-
fected by lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving doors,
so that the wealthy have disproportionate influence. Thus, as in-
equality grows, at least in many countries, so too do constraints
on the government’s fiscal space (Stiglitz, 2012, p.33).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces our macroeco-
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nomic model; Section 3 provides an analysis of model results obtained by
means of Monte Carlo ripetitions; we also check for the robustness of our
results through sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In the light of the considerations above, we build a macroeconomic model
with an agent-based household sector. Our goal is to show how the institu-
tional setting and credit conditions interact with the impact of rising inequal-
ity on the performance of the economy and the accumulation of household
debt. Our work follows part of the literature on macro agent-based models.
In particular, Cardaci (2014) analyses the consequence of rising inequality
in a context of peer e↵ects in consumption and equity extraction processes.
The paper shows that widening income disparities result in a debt-financed
consumption boom that jeopardises the stability of the economic system (a
similar result is found in Russo et al., 2015). Our paper represents a step
forward. In fact, not only we include an analysis of the impact of inequality
for di↵erent degrees of financialisation, but we also assess the e↵ectiveness
of di↵erent fiscal policy reactions. This is in line with the contribution by
Dosi et al. (2013) that focuses on the e↵ect of inequality under di↵erent
monetary and fiscal policies. They show that more unequal societies su↵er
from more severe business cycles oscillations and higher unemployment rates
thus increasing the likelihood of economic crises. Yet, their model allows for
the accumulation of private debt by firms only. On the contrary, we apply
our analysis on household loans since, in our opinion, the link between in-
equality and financial instability in the recent years ran precisely through
household debt (Cardaci, 2014; Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013). On the other
hand, this might allow for a generalisation of the policy implications of our
findings.
Our model is also stock-flow consistent (SFC). The SFC approach is
commonly used in the Post-Keynesian literature and dates back to the con-
tributions by Tobin (1969, 1982) and, more recently, Godley and Lavoie
(2007). The idea behind this methodology is that transactions in asset
stocks imply the existence of an interlocked system of balance sheets, as
Godley and Lavoie (2007) point out. As such, SFC models are built upon
an accounting framework whose goal is to coherently integrate all stocks and
flows of an economy, so that “every monetary flow, in accordance with the
double-entry book keeping logic, is recorded as a payment for one sector and
a receipt for another sector, and every financial stock is recorded as an asset
for a sector and a liability for another sector” (Caiani et al., 2014).
Let us now go through the details of the modelling structure.
Our model follows the “KISS” (keep it simple, stupid!) principle. As
such, we devote our e↵ort to the development of the household sector, while
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simplifying all the others as much as possible. Hence, the distinctive features
of our economy are as follows:
• There is only one representative firm which is owned by all households
and distributes all its earnings thus retaining zero profits.
• There is no investment in capital goods.
• Households’ desired consumption is based on imitative behaviour and,
more precisely, on the Expenditure Cascades hypothesis (Frank et al.,
2014)
• There is a credit market for non-collateralised loans to households.
• There is a public sector with a government that can issue bonds to
finance its deficit (if any).
The model has a sequential structure regarding decisions about flows
and actual balance-sheet transactions. The entire sequence of events in each
period t can be summarised as follows:
1. Production takes place. The firm produces homogenous perishable
goods using labour as the only input.
2. The firm distributes wages to all households. This process is based on
individual income shares drawn from a Pareto distribution.
3. If the commercial bank has a positive net worth, it distributes the
entire amount of profits to households based on the same income shares
as in the previous point. However, in case of a negative net worth, the
commercial bank is bailed out by the central bank via a transfer of
assets (i.e. reserves). Note that, in any case, the commercial bank has
zero net worth at the end of this phase.
4. Households pay taxes. Tax payment is based on a progressive system
of taxation on income. Tax rates are computed endogenously in period
t and they remain constant for all the remaining periods. Collected
taxes add up to the government deposit account held by the central
bank.
5. The government then pays back its principal and interest on bonds to
each household, based on the repayment schedule set in the previous
period.
6. Households compute their desired consumption based on imitative be-
haviour and assess their own financial position. This latter may be
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positive, if their internal resources are higher than their desired con-
sumption and due debt, or negative, otherwise. Households with a pos-
itive financial position use the exceeding amount of internal resources
to demand government bonds, whereas households with a negative fi-
nancial position ask for a loan. Note that, as such, households can
demand loans in order to finance desired consumption as well as to
perform debt rollover, that is, to pay back the debt from the previous
period.
7. Policy institutions decide their targets: the central bank sets the policy
interest rate while the government sets its desired public expenditure.
Both decisions are based on the value of the “demand gap” in the
previous period and follow an anti-cyclical rule.
8. The bond market opens: if desired public expenditure exceeds col-
lected taxes and past deposits, the government needs to borrow from
households, thereby computing its supply of bonds. Total bond de-
mand simply equals the sum of individual bond demand by each house-
hold, as mentioned in point 6. Note that the bond market may be in
disequilibrium since total supply and demand are the result of inde-
pendent decisions.
9. The pay-back phase (PBP) begins: households pay back the loan (prin-
cipal plus interest) from the previous period. This does not include
borrowers who need to perform debt rollover, as they do not have the
internal resources to meet their debt obligations entirely. Hence, they
will enter the credit market trying to get a new loan and, afterwards,
they will go through a second PBP in order to repay the old one.
10. The credit market opens: the bank sets its total available credit supply
as a fraction of total credit demand and ranks households in ascending
order based on their financial soundness. Loan applications, computed
by households at step 6, are satisfied until the bank runs out of total
credit supply. This implies that credit-rationing may occur in the mar-
ket: more financially fragile households may not get any loan from the
commercial bank. Credit-rationed households will not be able to fi-
nance their desired consumption entirely and to perform debt rollover.
Hence they go bankrupt and as such they are not allowed to apply for
a new loan for a number of periods.
11. A second PBP opens: households who needed debt rollover and suc-
cessfully got a new loan in the credit market, can now pay back the
loan from the previous period.
12. The goods market opens: government and households buy goods based
on their desired level of consumption. If the output produced by the
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firm at step 1 is lower than overall desired consumption, rationing
takes place. On the contrary, in case of excess supply, we assume the
firm gets rid of the unsold amount of its perishable goods at no cost.
13. Finally, all macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP, Public Debt, Private
Debt) are updated.
Figure 2: Transaction flows in our economy.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of all the transactions taking
place in our artificial economy, based on the sequence reported above. These
are represented as flows from a typology of agents to the others. In order
to make sure that our model is stock-flow consistent so that no flow “leaks
out” of the system, each agent is provided with a balance sheet that allows
us to track and measure the levels of all stock variables at any point in time.
Figure 3 shows the balance sheets of all the agents in the economy at the
end of each period.3
Stock-flow consistency implies that any transaction that takes place in
the economy is matched by an identical change in the stocks held in the
balance sheets of the agents involved. For example, when the firm pays the
wage bill, it transfers all of its deposits to the household sector through the
commercial bank. Figure 4 provides a numerical example: firm deposits
lower by their entire amount, whereas household deposits increase accord-
ingly. This transaction is reported also on the liability side of the balance
3For simplicity, households are represented as an aggregate sector. Note, however, that
the generic household h holds the same typology of assets and liabilities as the aggregate
sector.
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Figure 3: Agents’ balance sheets in our economy.
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sheet of the bank. Yet, the net worth of the bank does not change since
a transfer of deposits does not modify the overall amount of liabilities it
holds.4 In general, at the end of each period, agents may have positive or
negative individual net worth, depending on the di↵erence between assets
and liabilities. However, stock-flow consistency in our model implies that
the overall value of the net worth in the economy must always be zero, not
only at the end of each period t but also right after any transaction.
Let us now introduce the rules of behaviour for each category of agent
and sector of the economy.
2.1 Production
The representative firm has a limited role to play in our model: it distributes
wages and reacts to disequilibria in the goods market by changing total pro-
duction. The firm is owned by the entire population of households, H, who
all work for it. As shown in Equations 1 and 2, current production (Qt) and
prices (Pt) depend on their level in the previous period and on a sensitivity
parameter ( Q and  P respectively) multiplied by the demand gap. This
latter is defined as the previous period di↵erence between aggregate demand
and production, divided by production itself, that is gapt 1 = ADt 1 Qt 1Qt 1 .
In other words, the demand gap represents a measure of the real term excess
demand or supply in the past.
Qt = Qt 1 (1 +  Q · gapt 1) (1)
Pt = Pt 1 (1 +  P · gapt 1) (2)
At the beginning of each period, the firm distributes its entire revenues,
collected at the end of t   1, to the population in the form of wages. The
distribution process is based on constant individual income shares that are
drawn from a Pareto distribution. This is consistent with empirical evidence
suggesting that income is generally distributed according to a power-law
distribution and, more specifically, to a Pareto, particularly at top of the
income scale (Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; Jones, 2015).
2.2 Expenditure Cascades and Financial Assessment
Individual household income (Equation 3) is defined as the sum of wages
(wt,h), profits from the bank (⇡t,h, if any) and the repayment schedule on
government bonds from the previous period (RSGt 1,h, if any).
4In principle, such transfer of liabilities takes place among di↵erent banks and, as
such, it has to be matched by an equal transfer of reserves on the asset side of their
balance sheets. Nonetheless, this change does not occur in our case because our simplified
framework features a single representative bank.
74
Figure 4: Numerical example of a wage payment. The firm transfers all of
its revenues to the household sector as wages. This implies a transfer of
deposits from the balance sheet of the former to that of the latter. This
modifies their net worth. Also the bank records this change on the liability
side of its balance sheet, even though its overall net worth remains the same.
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yt,h = wt,h + ⇡t,h +RSGt 1,h (3)
After receiving income, households pay taxes based on a progressive tax
system, with constant tax rates set in period 1. Hence, individual disposable
income (ydt,h) is given by income net of the due amount of taxes (Tt,h), as
defined in Equation 4.
ydt,h = yt,h   Tt,h (4)
Consumption behaviour in our model is based on peer e↵ects and imi-
tation. This is consistent with the empirical literature on behavioural eco-
nomics, as reported in Cardaci (2014), Fazzari and Cynamon (2013) and
Frank et al. (2014). In particular, similar to Cardaci (2014), the formula-
tion of desired consumption in our model follows the Expenditure Cascades
(EC) hypothesis introduced by Frank et al. (2014), with a slightly amended
formulation (Equation 5).
Cdt,h = k · ydt,h + a · Ct 1,j (5)
Therefore, h’s desired consumption is a function of her disposable income
(ydt,h) as well as j’s actual consumption in the previous period, where j is
the household who ranks just above h in the income scale, so that j = h+1.
k is “a parameter unrelated to permanent income level or rank” (Frank
et al., 2014), while the sensitivity parameter a is such that 0  a  1:
“when a = 1, h fully mimics j’s consumption; whereas when a = 0, h does
not consider j’s consumption” (Cardaci, 2014).
As already mentioned, households carry out an assessment of their finan-
cial position, by comparing their expected expenditures with their internal
resources. That is, if the sum of desired consumption and the repayment
schedule on loans from the previous period (RSt 1,h5) is higher than the
sum of their disposable income and past deposits (Dt 1,h), households have
a negative financial position and apply for a loan (Ldt,h) to the banking sector.
That is:
if Cdt,h +RSt 1,h > ydt,h +Dt 1,h
then Ldt,h = C
d
t,h +RSt 1,h   ydt,h  Dt 1,h (6)
On the contrary, households with enough internal resources to finance
desired consumption and repayment schedule, ask for government bonds
(Bdt,h). Hence:
5The repayment schedule on loans is defined in section 2.4.
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if Cdt,h +RSt 1,h  ydt,h +Dt 1,h
then Bdt,h = ydt,h +Dt 1,h   Cdt,h  RSt 1,h (7)
2.3 Bond Market
At the beginning of each period, the government sets its (Gdt ) as a percentage
of GDP. As already pointed out, this decision follows an anti-cyclical rule.
In particular, the government adjusts the initial value of such ratio ( G
d
GDP ,
computed in period 1) based on its sensitivity ( G) to the demand gap in
the previous period.
Gdt
GDPt 1
=
Gd
GDP
   G · gapt 1 (8)
Afterwards, the government carries out its own financial assessment by
computing the di↵erence between its expected expenditure (the sum of de-
sired public expenditure and the repayment schedule on public bonds issued
in the previous period, RSGt 1) and its available internal resources (the
sum of past deposits, Dt 1,g, and the amount of taxes collected, Tt). If this
is negative, the government has enough resources to finance the expected
expenditure. On the contrary, if the di↵erence is positive, the government
has to finance its expenditure by issuing new public bonds. The overall
supply of bonds is defined in Equation 9.
BSt = G
d
t +RSGt  Dt,g (9)
Note that government deposits at time t are defined as the sum between
past deposits and tax revenues, so that Dt,g = Dt 1,g + Tt. We assume
that bonds are one period debt contracts between households and the gov-
ernment. Hence, in the following period, the government will pay back
RSGt 1, which includes both principal and interests. We also make the
assumption that the interest rate on bonds is equal to the policy rate set by
the central bank (see Section 2.4).
It is wort noting that there is no mechanism that guarantees that the
bond market is in equilibrium. In other words, as the formulation of bond
demand and supply are based on independent decisions by households and
the government, rationing may take place in the bond market. Indeed, if
total bond supply is higher than demand, all households asking for bonds get
the desired amount. Still, in the opposite case, all applicants are rationed so
that the amount each h gets is equal to Bdt,h
BSt
BDt
, where BDt is total bond
demand (i.e. BDt =
P
hB
d
t,h).
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2.4 Pay Back Phase and Credit Market
As pointed out in Section 2.2, only households with a negative financial
position enter the credit market. Note, however, that we distinguish two
types of borrowers: consumption borrowers (CB) and borrowers in financial
distress (FDB). CB are all households whose own resources are enough to
pay back their repayment schedule on the loan from the previous period6.
Hence, they enter the market in order to get a loan to finance their desired
consumption only. On the contrary, FDB ask for a new loan not only to
finance consumption but also to perform debt rollover. In other words, FDB
use the new loan to pay back the previous one.
The commercial bank sets a maximum allowable credit supply as a frac-
tion of total credit demand (Equation 10).
LSt = vt
X
h
Ldt,h (10)
Note that vt 2 [vmin, vmax]. That is, the commercial bank endogenously
changes the value of vt within two boundaries (vmin and vmax) that are
exogenously set in the initialisation phase of the model (Conditions 11 and
12). In particular, vt evolves as a function of systemic risk which is proxied
by the household debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous period, debtt 1GDPt 1 . In
fact, we introduce an exogenous parameter (threshold) that represents the
sensitivity threshold to the level of the household debt-to-GDP ratio, so
that if the ratio is higher (lower) than the threshold, the bank decreases
(increases) vt.
if debtt 1GDPt 1 > threshold then vt = vt 1    v(vmin   vt 1) (11)
if debtt 1GDPt 1 < threshold then vt = vt 1 +  v(vmax   vt 1) (12)
The sensitivity threshold, as well as the two boundaries for vt, represent
our key parameters in the simulation phase of the model as they act on the
willingness to lend of the commercial bank and on its reaction to systemic
risk. Hence, a more financialised economy is one in which both threshold
and vmax are set to high values.
The commercial bank ranks households in ascending order based on a
measure of their financial soundness - namely the total debt service ratio
(TDS)7 - and supplies credit by matching each individual demand until
LSt = 0. As a consequence, if vt < 1, less financially sound applicants
6CB also includes households with zero repayment schedule, that is, those who did not
take any loan in t  1.
7Following Cardaci (2014), TDS is defined as the ratio between household repayment
schedule and disposable income.
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(namely, households with a higher TDS) will be rationed on the credit mar-
ket thus getting no loans at all. Borrowers who are credit-rationed cannot
pay back their previous loan and, in some cases, finance their desired con-
sumption entirely. Therefore, they will go bankrupt and as such they are
not allowed to apply for another loan for a limited period of time.
Similar to bonds, we assume each loan is a one-period debt contract
corresponding to a repayment schedule defined as RSt,h = Lt,h(1 + rLt,h),
to be paid back entirely in the following period. Similar to Russo et al.
(2015) and Cardaci (2014), the interest rate on loans is made up of three
components, as described by Equation 13.
rLt,h = rt + brt + rt,h (13)
brt is a system-specific component that reflects the sensitivity of the bank
to the household debt-to-GDP ratio of the economy, so that brt = ⇢ debtt 1GDPt 1 ,
while rt,h is a household-specific component equal to µTDSt,h, where µ is
the bank sensitivity to household total debt service ratio. Finally, rt is the
policy rate set by the central bank at the beginning of each period (Equation
14). Similar to desired public expenditure, the central bank reacts to changes
in the demand gap.8
rt = rt 1 +  CB · gapt 1 (14)
Once transactions in the credit market are over, a new PBP begins: all
FDB who successfully got a loan now pay back their due debt RSt 1,h.
2.5 Goods Market
Both the government and households interact with the firm in order to buy
goods. Note that each agent on the demand side may have an actual capac-
ity of spending that di↵ers from the desired one. As a matter of fact, even
though the government is willing to spend an amount equal to Gdt , it is possi-
ble that its liquidity does not allow to do so and its actual spending capacity
is constrained by its current deposits (Dt,g), which include collected taxes,
issued bonds and past deposits. Hence actual maximum government expen-
diture is defined as min(Gdt , Dt,g). Similarly, some households might not be
able to finance their desired consumption entirely due to credit rationing,
as already pointed out. As a consequence, actual maximum expenditure for
each household is equal to min(Cdt,h, Dt,h).
Before transactions take place, the firm compares aggregate demand in
real terms (Equation 15) with the amount of quantities produced.
8As quantities and prices move in the same direction, the central bank is implicitly
targeting inflation as well.
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ADt =
min(Gdt , Dt,g) +
P
hmin(C
d
t,h, Dt,h)
Pt
(15)
If the former is lower than the latter, each buyer will obtain the de-
manded amount of goods, while the firm will get rid of excess supply at
no cost. In the opposite case, instead, all buyers in the goods market
will be rationed. If such a circumstance occurs, the firm computes a “ra-
tioning ratio” equal to QtADt . This applies equally to the government as
well as each household, so that all buyers are rationed in the same way
and actual household consumption and government spending are defined as
Ct,h = min(Cdt,h, Dt,h)
Qt
ADt
and Gt = min(Gdt , Dt,g)
Qt
ADt
.
3 Model Results
Model results are obtained by means of computer simulations. We start by
replicating the following three scenarios:
• a baseline (BS) scenario with income shares that are fixed at the be-
ginning of the first period and remain constant over time;
• a rising-inequality (RS) scenario in which we change the value of indi-
vidual income shares over time to simulate increasing income dispari-
ties;
• finally, a credit-inequality (CS) scenario in which the maximum propen-
sity to lend of the bank rises along with the same rise of inequality
simulated in RS.
We also run some additional experiments to assess di↵erent model dy-
namics when financial conditions, as well as policy implementations, change.
For each scenario we perform 20 Monte Carlo (MC) repetitions selecting
a di↵erent random seed at each run, similar to Delli Gatti et al. (2011)
and Russo et al. (2015). The choice of our parameter vector, shown in
Table 2, is based on the need to rule out explosive dynamics and unrealistic
patterns. In addition, we also perform both univariate and multivariate
sensitivity analysis in order to test the robustness of model results to changes
in parameter values.
3.1 Monte Carlo Analysis of the Three Scenarios
For each scenario, we compute the cross-simulation mean of the key vari-
ables. For example, we calculate GDP at each time t as the average of GDP
across the 20 MC ripetitions for each of the three scenarios. Moreover, we
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Parameter Value
T Number of periods 1000
H Number of households 200
k Propensity to consume for h = 1 : H   1 0.8
kH Propensity to consume for h = H 0.6
a Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption 0.6
vmax Maximum propensity to lend 0.4
vmin Minimum propensity to lend 0.1
⇢ Bank sensitivity to debt/gdp ratio 0.005
µ Bank sensitivity to TDS 0.005
 Q Output sensitivity to output gap 0.01
 P Price sensitivity to output gap 0.01
 G Government sensitivity to output gap 0.05
 CB Central bank sensitivity to output gap 0.05
 v Speed of adjustment for credit supply 0.05
freeze Number of “freezing” periods for bankrupt borrowers 5
threshold Bank threshold for debt-to-GDP ratio 0.5
Table 2: Model calibration
drop the first 200 periods in order to get rid of transients, that is the stabil-
isation phase of the model. Graphs only show the last 800 periods for this
reason. Furthermore, following Cardaci (2014), all data generated by our
model are represented as simple moving averages in order to smooth out the
cyclical fluctuations of the time series.
BS is based on the calibration shown in Table 2, while in the other two
scenarios we implement the following shocks:
• RS: the income share of the top 10% increases gradually (from period
401 to period 600) from 22% to 37%.
• CS: we perform the same inequality shock as in RS, together with a
sudden rise in vmax which increases from 0.4 to 0.8 in period 401.
All the key time series obtained by means of MC repetitions show smooth
and minor oscillations along a stationary trend in the baseline scenario (as
confirmed by Table 3, which reports also the average growth rates of GDP
in all the 20 MC simulations for the baseline scenario). In particular, the
model seems to stabilise along a quasi-steady state. As shown in Figure 5,
GDP in BS is rather flat over time.
Let us provide a narrative for the other two scenarios.
• RS. Figure 5 shows quite distinctly that a rise in income disparities
results in falling GDP. As a matter of fact, when income moves from
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Figure 5: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) in BS
(blue), RS (red), CS (yellow).
the bottom to the top of the distribution, overall desired consumption
rises for a very small number of periods due to stronger expenditure
cascades. However, financial parameters (vmax, threshold and  v) in
RS do not change compared to their baseline values and the econ-
omy remains poorly financialised as it is in BS. As a consequence,
households do not find enough credit supply to finance their increased
desired expenditure and demand for loans. Indeed, in the baseline the
household debt-to-GDP ratio is well below the bank sensitivity thresh-
old and, consequently, vt rises endogenously up to vt = vmax, 8t. That
is, in BS the banking system endogenously increases its willingness to
lend up to its maximum value as it detects low systemic risk. Yet,
as vmax is calibrated at a low value in BS and RS (see Table 2), the
result of increasing inequality in our economy with a low degree of
financialisation and credit availability is a recession with falling debt
and desired consumption.
• CS. Similar to RS, as soon as income inequality starts to increase,
household desired consumption grows because of stronger imitation ef-
fects. However, the degree of financialisation is di↵erent in CS, as the
commercial bank has a higher maximum willingness to supply credit.
That is, a greater value of vmax allows vt to rise endogenously so that
a broader number of borrowers actually finds the necessary external
resources to finance their desired spending. In fact, even if income
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Simulation
Average growth
rate (%)
Mean Variance
Standard
Deviation
1 1.51 15443.80 2848.26 53.37
2 1.31 15685.65 8572.67 92.59
3 1.11 15382.01 3138.18 56.02
4 0.17 15636.93 4992.87 70.66
5 0.61 15593.71 3554.80 59.62
6 1.47 15639.42 8035.21 89.63
7 1.03 15416.06 5673.53 75.32
8 0.89 15428.54 3084.45 55.54
9 0.97 15415.67 2321.31 48.18
10 1.09 15518.28 5624.1 74.99
11 1.07 15606.42 4321.62 65.74
12 0.3 15200.34 2895.02 53.8
13 0.76 15752.72 3546.91 59.55
14 1.39 15536.94 5783.84 76.05
15 0.19 15516.43 2847.19 53.36
16 0.35 15491.02 4382.62 66.2
17 1.1 15574.72 9465.53 97.29
18 0.72 15592.42 3043.92 55.17
19 1.16 15484.07 2836.83 53.36
20 0.36 15471.21 2838.9 53.28
Table 3: Key statistics for BS-GDP in the 20 MC simulations.
disparities become wider, GDP rises in CS as a result of debt-financed
consumption. Also note that the default rate of borrowers actually
goes down. This is not surprising: higher credit availability results in
a greater number of households who successfully perform debt-rollover
and as such more borrowers are actually able to pay back their older
loans. Nonetheless, this also implies that household debt grows faster
than GDP: the debt-to-GDP ratio increases as well, going beyond the
threshold level set by the commercial bank. This is the turning point:
the bank starts decreasing its willingness to lend and, as a conse-
quence the portion of overall credit demand that is actually matched
by credit supply drops thus triggering the recession. Two aspects are
worth stressing: (1) the fall in GDP is slower than that of desired
consumption and (2) credit demand and supply remain substantially
higher compared to their baseline level, even though they both expe-
rience much wider oscillations along a roughly decreasing trend. The
first point can be explained by the impact of public spending which
decreases but at a fairly slower rate than private spending. The sec-
ond point, instead is explained by looking at the number of households
who need debt rollover, which remains stable at around 60% after the
peak of GDP and debt. This entails a change in the nature of credit:
the higher demand for credit after the recession comes from FDB and
it is, as such, for debt rollover purposes rather than for consumption
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financing.
3.2 Financialisation and Institutional Setting
The results of our three main scenarios suggest that where credit constraints
are relaxed, higher loan demand can be matched by a wider availability of
credit thereby resulting in higher household debt that sustains aggregate
demand at the price of greater instability; whereas, if access to credit is
harder and its availability is subject to tighter regulation, widening income
disparities are not compensated by increased borrowing and, as such, the
economy performs badly.
We now want to provide a deeper analysis of the impact of growing
inequality on household debt and the performance of the economy under
di↵erent degrees of financialisation. To do so, we run two more sets of
simulations by randomly drawing 20 di↵erent values for vmax and threshold.
For each of these values, we also perform 20 MC repetitions, each with a
di↵erent random seed (for a total of 400 simulations).
In the first case we reproduce a multitude of scenarios where the bank
has a di↵erent maximum willingness to lend, while in the second case we
test how greater credit availability interacts with di↵erent sensitivities to
the household debt-to-GDP ratio by the bank.
Let us start from changes in vmax. When inequality rises, we increase
the maximum willingness to lend of the bank without changing the value
of threshold or any other parameter in the model. Figure 6 reports our
key results for selected values of vmax. The graphs show that a higher
value of vmax corresponds to a greater boom and bust cycle, as expected.
That is, a stronger degree of financialisation allows for more debt-financed
consumption by households, while a lower amount of credit availability forces
the economy into the recession since the downward pressure on the aggregate
demand is not compensated by higher household debt.
Next we investigate the case of a di↵erent threshold in CS. That is,
when inequality increases, the bank is willing to supply more credit, since
vmax jumps from 0.4 to 0.8 in CS, but it also has di↵erent sensitivities to
the household debt-to-GDP ratio (starting from period 1 and letting the
other parameters unchanged). Our results for selected values of threhsold
are shown in Figure 7. Clearly, threshold is a key parameter in determining
model dynamics. As a matter of fact, lower values of threshold imply a worse
performance of the economy, regardless of the increased willingness to lend of
the bank. In particular when threshold is less or equal to 0.1, the economy in
CS performs even worse than in the RS scenario where threshold = 0.5 and
vmax = 0.4. In general, our findings seem to bring about further evidence
that the degree of financialisation matters, even when we look at another
dimension, namely the sensitivity of the commercial bank to systemic risk.
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Figure 6: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for vmax
equal to 0.5724 (purple), 0.5846 (green), 0.6023 (light blue), 0.6894 (dark
red), compared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
Figure 7: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for
threshold equal to 0.1048 (green), 0.2041 (purple), 0.2533 (light blue),
0.3705 (dark red) compared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
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3.3 Policy Responses
We now move on to the analysis of di↵erent policy interventions. In par-
ticular, we compare a “Keynesian” type of policy - consisting in a bolder
reaction of desired government expenditure to the demand gap9 - with an
increase in ”progressivity” of the tax system that tackles inequality by redis-
tributing income from the top to the bottom of the population. Our results
suggest that the second type of policy has a clearer and stronger e↵ect on
the overall economy with respect to an intervention of the first type.
Simulations are carried out following the same procedure introduced
above: we randomly draw 20 di↵erent values for  G and for each of them
we also perform 20 MC repetitions in each of the three scenarios (hence, we
perform 1200 computer simulations in total). We find that, a greater value
of  G does not avoid the recession that results from rising inequality in the
RS scenario. Moreover, in the CS scenario, that is when inequality rises
together with the maximum willingness to lend of the banking system, the
impact of the Keynesian policy reaction is non tangible. That is, the time
series for the key variables do not show any significant di↵erence (in terms
of magnitude, duration and volatility of the boom and bust cycle) compared
to the standard time series obtained in the CS scenario with  G equal to its
baseline value.
What happens if, instead, the government reacts to rising inequality by
changing the tax rates such that it redistributes income from households at
the top of the distribution to those at the bottom? In this case, the impact
on the economy is strong and positive. Note that we analyse the fiscal
reform in RS so that all model parameters, including the financial ones, do
not change.
Selected simulations are reported in Figure 8. They all show that more
progressive systems manage to counterbalance the (exogenous) change in
the Pareto distribution that alters the original distribution of income. Re-
gardless of the degree of progressivity, the economy has a higher and more
stable GDP compared to the baseline, as well as a similar level of house-
hold debt. This latter is also much lower than in CS. In any case, a more
progressive tax system results in a dramatic boom in GDP followed by a pro-
longed period of stability. This is not surprising: by counterbalancing the
rising trend in inequality, the government provides poorer households with
the necessary internal resources to finance their desired consumption. As a
consequence, the household sector relies much less on debt accumulation so
that both household debt and household debt-to-GDP stabilise around the
baseline level after a certain number of periods.
As far as our result seem to push in favour of a structural reform with
a more progressive tax system, for the sake of completeness it is worth
9Notice that, consistently with the first part of the General Theory, we interpret as
Keynesian a proactive government, rather than a large government.
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Figure 8: GDP (top left), aggregate desired consumption (top right), house-
hold debt (bottom left) and household debt-to-GDP (bottom right) for dif-
ferent levels of progressive tax system (purple, green and light blue) com-
pared to baseline (blue), RS (red) and CS (yellow).
pointing out that we do not take into account any consideration regarding
the distortionary e↵ect that greater progressivity may have on other aspects
of the economy, such as the functioning of labour markets or firm profits
and investment decisions. The interpretation of our results should therefore
be limited to considering that an increase in progressiveness is more e cient
than macroeconomic policies in tackling the expenditure cascades that follow
an rise in inequality. Any further interpretation would be unwarranted given
the simplified structure of our model.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check whether our model results are biased by the specific com-
bination of parameter values, we perform both univariate and multivariate
sensitivity analysis. This allows us to test the robustness of the model fol-
lowing changes in the parameter vector.
Univariate analysis consists in assessing variations in model outcome
while performing changes in one parameter at a time, leaving all the others
constant. As Delli Gatti et al. (2011) point out, “the model is then believed
to be good if the output values of interest do not vary significantly despite
significant changes in the input values”.
In the univariate case, we select 12 parameters of our model and we
randomly draw 20 values within a reasonable min-max interval for each
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individual parameter at a time, leaving all the other ones unchanged. Then,
for each of the 20 values, we perform 20 MC repetitions, each with a di↵erent
random seed, in the 3 scenarios (BS, RS and CS). Therefore, the univariate
analysis of a single parameter implies 1200 simulations. Since we explore 12
parameters, we run 14400 simulations in total.
As a general comment, we highlight that for most variables the resulting
variations in output are smaller than the variations in the parameters. This
indicates that results are indeed quite robust with respect to univariate
changes in model parameters.
Table 4 reports the variation for each parameter between its minimum
and maximum value in the sensitivity analysis and the corresponding cross-
series variation in GDP at time 500 for BS and at time 1000 for RS and CS10.
With the only exception of a and k, output variations in the baseline scenario
are consistently small for a very wide range of values for each individual
parameter. Notice that variations in two parameters, namely vmax and
 v, do not determine any change in output in BS. Univariate analysis also
shows that individual changes in a wide range of model parameters have no
significant e↵ect on the dynamics of the model in the RS scenario either,
even though freeze has a slightly more relevant role than in BS. Finally, as
expected, all parameters have a more distinctive impact on model dynamics
in CS: our analysis confirms the primary role of the consumption parameters,
a and k, as well as of the financial parameters related to the behaviour of
the banking system, namely threshold and vmax.
Parameter
Variation in
parameter (%)
Variation in
GDP-BS at t 500
(%)
Variation in
GDP-RS at t
1000 (%)
Variation in
GDP-CS at t
1000 (%)
k 65.1 12.68 25.60 102.18
a 302.64 28.4 60.37 231.22
vmax 103.56 0 0 53.69
⇢ 355.25 1.3 2.15 14.38
µ 2505.26 0.39 1.59 19.39
 Q 1369.17 0.98 3.47 22.05
 P 1817.82 1.73 3.69 14.36
 G 274.37 2.38 1.59 9.71
 CB 288.55 1.22 1.39 14.08
 v 747.62 0 0 34.72
freeze 350 3.42 10.02 30.9
threshold 660.69 0.45 0.54 59. 44
Table 4: Min-max variations in parameter values for univariate sensitivity
analysis, together with corresponding cross-series variation in GDP at time
500 in BS and at time 1000 in RS and CS.
10For the sake of simplicity, we report values for GDP only since our results show that
variations in the other key time series are in line with those for GDP.
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Figure 9: GDP in the multivariate sensitivity analysis.
The univariate analysis for the CS scenario shows that values of a be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 result in shorter boom and longer busts, whereas a > 0.6
implies a wider duration of the expanding phase of the economy. In addition,
values of k lower than 0.5 seem to counterbalance the impact of a higher
willingness to lend, as the CS scenario collapses to the RS in this case. a and
k are not the only relevant parameters in CS. As a matter of fact, our results
suggest that  Q,  P ,  v, threshold and freeze have an impact on model
dynamics in this scenario as well. In particular, higher values of  Q and  P
imply greater booms and faster recessions. Higher values of  v and freeze
result in faster and stronger booms and longer busts over time, whereas the
higher threshold, the greater and longer the boom before the bust.
Multivariate analysis tests changes in model results with di↵erent cali-
brations of model parameters. In this case, we build 20 parameter vectors
for our model parameters. Each value in the vector is randomly draw within
a reasonable interval. Then, for each of the 20 vectors, we perform 20 MC
repetitions, each with a di↵erent random seed, in the three scenarios. Hence,
in the multivariate sensitivity analysis, we run 1200 simulations in total.
The multivariate analysis shows that the behaviour of the model is robust
to parameter changes. Figure 9, which shows GDP for each of the parameter
vectors, proves that almost any combination of parameters leads to the same
dynamics from a purely qualitative point of view. The only exception to
this is represented by the highest blue line in the graph (Figure 9): in CS,
for this specific combination of parameters, GDP booms in the expansion
phase of the economy while falling at a dramatically slow pace during the
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recession. By looking at the calibration for this particular case, one may
have an intuition about such dynamics: this scenario features a value of a
and k close to 1, a very low value of freeze (equal to 2), as well as a higher
threshold (around 0.6) and a much greater value for vmax (around 0.8).
We believe that the explanation for the entity of the boom, as well as its
sensationally slow negative growth in the recession, is to be found precisely in
the extremely high values of a, k and vmax that allow the model to follow the
same dynamics as in the standard CS with more pronounced values. In other
words, GDP booms as a consequence of stronger expenditure cascades and
greater availability of credit. However, after peaking, the economy enters a
recession and GDP starts to fall. Its remarkably small negative growth rate
might be the consequence of very low value of freeze as it implies easier
access to credit markets for both consumption and debt-rollover purposes.
In other words, even though the bank lowers its endogenous willingness to
lend, households who go bankrupt can still access the credit market after
a very few periods and, as such, debt-financed consumption keeps going on
during the recession (even though at a lower speed compared to the boom).
With the exception of the above mentioned case, we can generally con-
clude that results from our simulations are in line with those for the uni-
variate case. That is, our multivariate sensitivity analysis confirms the pri-
mary role of just a few model parameters, namely a and k in determining
model dynamics in BS and RS. It also highlights the importance of vmax
and threshold in the CS case, thus proving the importance of reproduc-
ing alternative financial and policy scenarios by changing the values of such
parameters.
4 Conclusion
Through an agent-based macroeconomic model with a stock-flow consis-
tent structure, we showed how di↵erent institutional settings and levels of
financialisation a↵ect the dynamics of an economy hit by an increase of in-
equality. In fact, when income disparities become wider, a dilemma arises.
That is, when the degree of financialisation is poor and financial institutions
are less willing to lend, increasing inequality implies a drop in aggregate de-
mand and output. On the contrary, when credit constraints are relaxed and
the financial sector is prone to lend, a short term positive e↵ect on growth
comes at the price of greater financial instability: a debt-driven boom and
bust cycle emerges. We then carried out an extensive sensitivity analysis,
both univariate and multivariate, that confirms the robustness of our main
findings.
Our results are in line with insights provided by Kumhof et al. (2012)
and Russo et al. (2015). The latter, in particular, build an agent-based
macroeconomic model showing that consumer credit has, on the one hand,
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a positive e↵ect on aggregate demand even though, on the other hand, it
accelerates the tendency of the economic system towards a crisis. However,
our work also focuses on policy reactions to rising inequality. As a matter of
fact, our results show that tackling inequality, by means of a more progres-
sive tax system, can compensate for the rise in income disparities thereby
stabilising the economy. Our findings also show that this is a better solution
compared to a proactive (Keynesian) fiscal policy reaction, as the latter has
no tangible counterbalancing e↵ect with respect to increasing income in-
equality. Therefore, in order to avoid being caught in between the Scyilla of
stagnant growth and the Charybdis of instability, it seems necessary to act
on the structure of the economy and act on the problem of inequality at its
roots.
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